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FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AS A WAY TO EXPLAIN
THE LACK OF PROGRESS OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS
IN AFGHANISTAN: THE NEED FOR A STATE
STRENGTH APPROACH1
ISAAC KFIR*
ABSTRACT
Cultural and religious practices are critical to explaining Afghan-
istan’s dreadful reputation concerning the preservation, protection,
and promotion of women’s rights. Those advocating misogynistic prac-
tices assert that the calls for reforms challenge their religion and cul-
ture, while also claiming that many women’s issues exist within the
private realm. Accordingly, they assert that re forms that aim at ad-
dressing disempowerment are not vital to the state and go beyond
the established limits of state authority. Building on feminist legal
theory, which distinguishes between the public and private spheres,
I argue in Afghanistan misogynistic and discriminatory practices
stem from contrived cultural and religious norms. Using the notion
of state strength, this Paper advances the idea that the discourses
countering the lack of official action in ending discrimination must
emphasize that unless women’s role in contemporary Afghan society
is strengthened, the state will continue to remain weak.2
INTRODUCTION
I. STATE STRENGTH: MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES
& UTILITARIANISM
II. FEMINISM, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, GENDER DISCRIMINATION
& INTERNATIONAL LAW
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III. ISLAM, WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMISM
A. Islamism: Its Role and Impact on Women’s Rights
B. Family Law and Women
C. Family, Tribal Practices, Patriarchy and Insecurity
IV. AFGHANISTAN AND WOMEN
A. Afghan Women in the Post-9/11 Period
1. The Afghan Constitution, Women and the
Supreme Court
2. The Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA)
3. The Law on Elimination of Violence Against
Women (EVAW)
B. Non-Governmental Organizations and
Afghan Women: RAWA
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Thompson Reuters Foundation published a survey
identifying the five worst countries in the world for women to live in.3
The worst was Afghanistan, followed by the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), Pakistan, India and Somalia.4 Afghanistan’s rank-
ing can be attributed to high incidence of targeted violence against
female public officials, appalling health care facilities for women and
widespread violence against women.5
Many in the non-Western world condemn surveys such as that
conducted by the Thompson Reuters Foundation, arguing that they
represent a poor grasp of non-Western societies and a deep mis-
understanding of cultural norms.6 Images produced by the media
promulgate the view that women are either brave opponents or
passive victims.7 Professor Lila Abu-Lughod captured this tension:
“[A]nthropologists, feminists, or concerned citizens . . . should be wary
3. Owen Bowcott, Worst Place in The World for a Woman: Violence Puts Afghanistan
at Top of List: Congo, Pakistan, Somalia and India Also in Top Five: Rape, Infanticide
and Poverty Rife, Says Report, GUARDIAN, June 15, 2011, at 19.
4. Id.
5. Id. See also U.N. Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, A Long Way to Go: Imple-
mentation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan (2011), at
1, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/8UQ7-QREQ.
6. Lila Abu-Lughod discusses some of these issues in her article. See Lila Abu-Lughod,
Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism
and Others, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 783, 788–89 (2002) (challenging and rejecting the
view that Muslim women need to be saved).
7. See Krista Hunt, The Strategic Co-optation of Women’s Rights, 4 INT’L FEMINIST
J. POL. 116, 117 (2002) (arguing that the increased interest in women’s issues in relation
to Afghanistan and other places stems from the desire to further legitimatize the “war
on terror”).
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of taking on the mantles of those 19th-century Christian missionary
women who devoted their lives to saving their Muslim sisters.”8 This
may explain why increasingly the non-Western feminist movement
has chosen to promote its agenda of empowering women through local
cultural norms,9 guaranteeing that the campaign for equality in these
societies has taken a different route.10
Afghanistan, which is transitioning out of conflict, emphasizes
the difficulty of harmonizing cultural and religious norms in tradi-
tional societies where religion is central while observing to basic
human rights.11 Given the large foreign presence in Afghanistan—
coupled with heightened expectations over women issues12—donors
expect and to some extend demand that Afghans share the donor’s
conception of gender equality.13 Concomitantly, donors denounce the
way the Taliban and their like-minded supporters view and treat
women.14 Notwithstanding the long international engagement in
8. Abu-Lughod, supra note 6, at 789. Abu-Lughod also argues:
A first step in hearing [women’s] wider message is to break with the language
of alien cultures, whether to understand or eliminate them. Missionary work
and colonial feminism belong in the past. Our task is to critically explore
what we might do to help create a world in which those poor Afghan women,
for whom “the hearts of those in the civilized world break,” can have safety
and decent lives.
Id. at 789–90.
9. See, e.g., Melissa Steyn, A New Agenda: Restructuring Feminism in South Africa,
21 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 41, 43–44 (1998) (highlighting how the feminist movement in
South Africa has sought to move away from the feminist movement of the apartheid era
and adopt a more inclusive and diverse agenda).
10. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
41 (1975) (discussing how the law is a tool to sustain traditional views and is a mecha-
nism to foster social change); Mala Htun & S. Laurel Weldon, State Power, Religion, and
Women’s Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Family Law, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
145, 145–47 (2011) (taking a cross-national approach to family law to highlight how some
countries have resisted reform due to alleged conflict with inherited legal traditions); Muna
Ndulo, African Customary Law, Customs and Women’s Rights, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 87, 87–92 (2011) (explaining the need for African courts to reform African customary
law to end discriminatory practices); Astri Suhrke, Reconstruction as Modernisation: The
“Post-Conflict” Project in Afghanistan, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1291, 1291 (2007) (arguing that
post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan contains a radical element because moderni-
zation has led to tensions associated with social change).
11. Huma Ahmed-Ghosh writes that her impression, based on conversations with
Afghan women, is that Afghan women desire not western human rights but rights that
lie “within the framework of Islam and not as a cultural imposition from the West.” She
adds, “Afghan women felt that the U.S. was pushing them to undermine Islam.” Huma
Ahmed-Ghosh, Voices of Afghan Women: Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Culture,
27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 27, 29 (2004–2005) [hereinafter Ahmed-Ghosh, Voices].
12. Laura Bush, Remember Afghanistan’s Women, WASH. POST, May 19, 2012, at A17.
13. Hilary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council 10th Anni-
versary Celebration Luncheon, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www
.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/186618.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/8XYA-M2P5.
14. In the preamble section to UN Security Council Resolution 1193, it is declared
that the Council has deep concern with “the continuing discrimination against girls and
90 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:087
Afghanistan, the country remains one of the worst countries for
women to live in15 as misogynist cultural and religious norms that
Afghan men create, shape and control, remain prevalent.16 Many
Afghan women must depend on male relatives even though the
Afghan constitution demands equal rights in accordance with inter-
national human rights law.17 The consequence of this dependence is
that an Afghan woman’s ability to determine her own present and
future is greatly curtailed, while her basic fundamental rights are
ignored.18 The situation exists because Afghan men select what power
and rights Afghan women will and should have.19 Consequently, when
it comes to empowerment,20 Afghan women face difficulties at all
levels of Afghan society.21
Substantial literature exists on the interaction between religion,
culture and women, as well as on Muslim women in contemporary
Muslim society.22 The literature concentrates on such issues as the
women . . . .” S.C. Res. 1193, ¶14 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1193 (Aug. 28, 1998). The Council
therefore urged the Taliban to cease its actions vis-à-vis women. Id. In Security Council
Resolution 1214, the Council altered its language to demand “that the Afghan factions
put an end to discrimination against girls and women . . . .” S.C. Res. 1214, ¶28 U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998); see also Taliban-style Curbs for Women in Afghanistan
Again?, KASHMIR MONITOR, July 22, 2013, available at http://kashmirmonitor.in/news
-taliban-style-curbs-for-women-in-afghanistan-again-51330.aspx, archived at http://perma
.cc/S2AM-4B4D.
15. See, e.g., The Women of Afghanistan: Important Gains in Women’s Rights Could
Be at Risk When American Troops Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, at A22.
16. See Lynne L. Manganaro & Nicholas O. Alozie, Gender Role Attitudes: Who Sup-
ports Expanded Rights for Women in Afghanistan?, 64 SEX ROLES 516, 526–27 (2011)
(examining how men and women view gender roles in Afghanistan and concluding that
men remain more conservative than women even though education and urban life help
counter such sentiments); Valentine M. Moghadam, Patriarchy in Transition: Women and
the Changing Family in the Middle East, 35 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 137, 157 (2004) (declaring
that “the Arab-Islamic family and its concomitants—rigid sex roles, women’s legal status
as minors, the prerogatives of fathers and husbands, high fertility—have been challenged
by socioeconomic developments (industrialization, the expansion of the urban labor market,
and education) and political action (state legal reform and women’s movements).”); Jawid
Omid, Violence Against Women Still Prevalent in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, XINHUA NEWS,
Dec. 16, 2013, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-12/16/c_13297
1788.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/URL9-36X2.
17. Naila Kabeer et al., Afghan Values or Women’s Rights? Gendered Narratives About
Continuity and Change in Urban Afghanistan 8 (IDS, Working Paper No. 387, Dec.
2011), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/donfile/Wp387.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/Y75P-CAPV.
18. Id.
19. Taliban-style Curbs for Women in Afghanistan Again?, supra note 14.
20. Empowerment refers to the idea of enhancing the capacity of an individual to make
and apply choices. See THE WORLD BANK, EMPOWERMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION: A
SOURCEBOOK 13–14 (Deepa Narayan ed., 2002); Kabeer et al., supra note 17, at 5.
21. Kabeer et al., supra note 17, at 7.
22. See Amber Rose Maltbie, Note, When the Veil and Vote Collide: Enhancing Muslim
Women’s Rights Through Electoral Reform, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 967, 967–68 (2009–2010)
(indicating how Muslim women’s participation in the electoral process in new democracies
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need to reject certain misogynistic practices,23 women and humanitar-
ianism,24 women and conflict,25 and women in post-conflict settings.26
In recognizing this and drawing from the aforementioned research,
this Paper contributes to the discourse by arguing that opponents
have moved women’s rights issues into the “private sphere,” 27 en-
suring that gender is constructed according to social, religious and
cultural norms28 while making the state less likely to address limits on
women’s participation in the public sphere.29 Thus, when for example
the Afghan Ulema Council decreed that men and women should not
mix in the workplace, it not only imposed restrictions on women’s
employability but also limited opportunities for women, as not many
people would wish to challenge the Council.30 Shaheen Sardar Ali
captures this challenge:
By applying the Islamic paradigm of equality of human dignity
and worth, and requiring “those in authority” i.e., men and the
can be suppressed by demanding that they lift their veil); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal
Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Class With a Construct?, 15 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 307, 402–03 (1993–1994) (rejecting an Orientalist approach to the study of
gender and human rights while arguing that Islam and international human rights law
are compatible); see also Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The “Honor” of the
“East” and the “Passion” of the “West”, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287, 306 (1997); Beth Baron,
Women, Honour, and the State: Evidence from Egypt, 42 MIDDLE E. STUD. 1, 2–3 (2006);
Serida Lucrezia Catalano, Shari’a Reforms and Power Maintenance: The Case of Family
Law in Reforms in Morocco and Algeria, 15 J. N. AFR. STUD. 535, 537 (2010); L. Elizabeth
Chamblee, Note, Rhetoric or Rights?: When Culture and Religion Bar Girls’ Right to
Education, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 1073, 1074–76 (2003–2004).
23. See BENAZIR BHUTTO, DAUGHTER OF DESTINY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY xi (1989);
TEHMINA DURRANI, MY FEUDAL LORD 363 (1991); MUKHTAR MAI, IN THE NAME OF HONOR:
A MEMOIR 143 (2007); Farah Deeba Chowdhury, Theorising Patriarchy: The Bangladesh
Context, 37 ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 599, 620–22 (2009).
24. See, e.g., Karen Engle, “Calling in the Troops:” The Uneasy Relationship Among
Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
189, 190 (2007) (expressing unease at the notion of military humanitarian intervention
which in effect calls for military action—violence—as a means to protect victims of human
rights violations).
25. MEGAN H. MACKENZIE, FEMALE SOLDIERS IN SIERRA LEONE: SEX, SECURITY AND
POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT 3 (2012); FREDLINE A.O. M’CORMACK-HALE, GENDER,
PEACE AND SECURITY: WOMEN’S ADVOCACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 (2012); FIONNUALA
NI AOLAIN ET AL.,ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER, WAR, AND THE POST-CONFLICT PROCESS
27 (2011).
26. Navnita Chadha Behera, Introduction to GENDER, CONFLICT AND MIGRATION 25–26
(Navnita Chadha Behera ed.) (2006); Faegheh Shirazi, Introduction to MUSLIM WOMEN
IN WAR AND CRISIS: REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 1 (Faegheh Shirazi ed., 2010).
27. See infra Part II.
28. See, e.g., Nancy Hatch Dupree, Cultural Heritage and National Identity in
Afghanistan, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 977, 978 (2002).
29. Frud Bezhan, Karzai Backs Afghan Clerics Over Stronger Restrictions on Women,
RADIO FREE EUROPE (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/karzai_backs_afghan
_clerics_on_women/24507032.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5MBZ-MQKK.
30. Id.
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State to accept responsibility for fulfilling the material needs of
women, children and other disadvantaged sections of society in
their charge, and provide them access and control over resources,
a move towards substantive as opposed to mere formal equality
for all may be possible.31
Ultimately, the Afghan state, whose institutions men dominate,
is either able to impose values and norms detrimental to women’s
rights or to ignore legal and moral obligations towards women.32 This
Paper, after reviewing the various challenges faced by Afghan women
and reviewing the current situation in Afghanistan, suggests that re-
framing the case for women’s rights through the language of “state
strength” would help challenge those opposing women’s rights and
women’s empowerment. It is argued that Afghanistan will remain a
perpetually weak state until it acknowledges gender inequality and
actively rejects it, as inequality in any form undermines the state.33
Notably, the Paper assumes neither that Afghan women need external
actors to “save” them34 nor that Islam—when understood correctly—
is the cause of discriminatory practices.35 Rather, it recognizes:
When the state is incapable or unwilling to represent the inter-
ests of members of society, the importance of family and kinship
relations is inflated. Consequently, any challenges to patriarchal
authority in the domestic sphere—including but not limited to
31. SHAHEEN SARDAR ALI, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: EQUAL BEFORE ALLAH, UNEQUAL BEFORE MAN? 88 (2000).
32. Bezhan, supra note 29.
33. A good example of this is the case of Azra Jafari, the mayor of the town of Nili in
Daykundi province. Initially, the cleric opposed Jafari because he felt that such a position
was inappropriate for a woman. However, once he saw the changes that Jafari began
implementing in the town, he changed his opinion and supported her. Golnar Motevalli,
Afghanistan’s First Female Mayor Proves Critics Wrong, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/24/afghanistan-first-female-mayor, archived
at http://perma.cc/ZJB7-R8YC.
34. Within the legal feminist movement, there is increasing opposition or distaste to-
wards the idea that non-Western women need to be saved by their western counterparts.
See, e.g., Abu-Lughod, supra note 6, at 788; Ahmed-Ghosh, Voices, supra note 11, at 29;
Engle, supra note 24, at 218.
35. See Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women:
An Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 311, 312 (1995) (high-
lighting commonly expressed discrepancies and inaccuracies about Islam’s treatment of
women); Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Comment, Islamic States and the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Are the Shari’a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 2011 (1994–1995)
(discussing the cultural bias within the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) with respect to Muslim countries and concluding
that “the Women’s Convention itself should be divested of any culturally insensitive or
unworkable language. Ultimately, its aim and purpose should be to afford women choices
and not to force women into lifestyles that they consider disagreeable”).
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challenges to the use of violence—can be construed as threaten-
ing to the family as an institution. This, in turn, lends itself to
the idea that increasing the rights of women would corrode and
menace the family, and, by extension, the social order. As the
irony comes full circle, many states are willing to champion or
accept the notion that women’s rights—and those who advocate
them—are threatening to society in order to shift critical atten-
tion from their own failings or to justify their own refusal to re-
form family and criminal laws.36
The argument is developed in the following manner. First, it
identifies that September 11 heightened interest in Islam, pressing
Muslims to ponder and question many practices and norms as part
of a desire to understand why nineteen men were willing to cause
such destruction.37 Interestingly, the introspection has brought some
legislative reforms, particularly as to women’s role, position and rights
in public spaces.38 Accordingly, the approach taken is that that Islam
is not the reason why women in Afghanistan endure discriminatory
practices. Rather, discrimination stems from contrived cultural and
religious norms that surface out of misreading, misunderstandings
or manipulation of the Qur’an.39 Accordingly, in claiming the exis-
tence of contrived cultural and religious practices,40 it is argued that
these norms are synthetic and their purpose is to uphold traditional
36. Lisa Hajjar, Religion, State Power, and Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies: A
Framework for Comparative Analysis, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 31 (2004).
37. See, e.g., JARED COHEN, CHILDREN OF JIHAD: A YOUNG AMERICAN’S TRAVEL AMONG
THE YOUTH OF THE MIDDLE EAST 34–35 (2007); FAWAZ A. GERGES, JOURNEY OF THE
JIHADIST: INSIDE MUSLIM MILITANCY 5 (2006).
38. Over the last few years, women’s representation in Muslim states has increased and
women-based NGOs have become more vocal and effective in gaining certain rights for
their constituents. This trend is evidenced, for example, in the changing role, presence and
advocacy of women’s groups in Saudi Arabia. Hanan Al-Ahmadi of the Institute of Public
Administration in Riyadh, while recognizing the need for more work, has noted the ad-
vances made by Saudi women over the past 10 years, particularly their increased partici-
pation in decision-making processes in the public and private sectors. Hanan Al-Ahmadi,
Challenges Facing Women Leaders in Saudi Arabia, 14 HUM. RESOURCES DEV. INT’L. 149
(2011). However, as Chamblee argues, the UN and human rights organizations have gen-
erally “kept a cautious distance from Islamic religious and cultural matters mentioning the
problems, but refusing to address them with anything more than study.” Chamblee, supra
note 22, at 1104.
39. Shaheen Sardar Ali states: “A book of Divine revelation such as the Qur’an coming
together over twenty-three years, is by its very nature open to varying interpretations.”
SARDAR ALI, supra note 31, at 87; see also Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad
Closed?, 16 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 4 (1984) (arguing that the Islamic jurists that
claimed that the gates of Ijtihad had been closed were marginalized and came to exist out-
side of Sunnism).
40. Culture is understood as shared codes or norms serving as blocs that structure
communities. Nina Eliasoph & Paul Lichterman, Culture in Interaction, 108 AM. J. SOC.
735, 735–36 (2003).
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authority and/or support an anachronistic power system. By devising
norms and exhibiting them as cultural or religious, the proponents
do so in reference to idyllic community, allowing them to further de-
fend these indefensible social restrictions.41 Moreover, opponents
recognize that as it is no longer acceptable or permissible to treat
Afghan women as second-class citizens,42 the argument in favor of em-
powerment is shaped to describe reform as a challenge to one’s cul-
ture and religion and therefore it is not only allowed but it is vital.43
Second, the reason of discrimination, from a religious standpoint,
stems from a misogynistic orthopraxy linked to Islamism,44 a per-
vasion of Islamic law.45 The third pillar posits that there has been
41. It is at times assumed that the reason for high level of fertility in the Arab (Muslim)
world stem from religious practices, however as the case of Iran and Algeria show the in-
fusion of oil money and changes in social (cultural) norms, women’s education increased
which had an impact on when women got married, which in turn had affected fertility
rates. Phillipe Fargues, Women in Arab Countries: Challenging the Patriarchal System?,
13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 43, 44–47 (2005). The debate over the purdah (curtain) in
South Asia is another good example in that what promotes it is status, division of labor and
the need for moral standards. Hanna Papanek, Purdah in Pakistan: Seclusion and Modern
Occupations for Women, 33 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM., 517, 518 (1971).
42. Afghanistan has ratified sixteen international human rights conventions, from the
1948 Genocide Convention, to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women (1979) to the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006). Chapter IV: Human Rights, UN TREATY
COLLECTION, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang
=en, archived at http://perma.cc/BU2U-KJK3. Moreover, the Afghan Constitution pro-
hibits discrimination. In the preamble it is stated Afghans seek to establish a “civil soci-
ety void of oppression, atrocity, discrimination as well as violence, based on rule of law,
social justice, protecting integrity and human rights, and attaining peoples’ freedoms and
fundamental rights.” CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (2004).
Article 62 requires that the president of Afghanistan be a Muslim though no reference is
made to their gender.
The individual who becomes a presidential candidate shall have the following
qualifications: 1. Shall be a citizen of Afghanistan, Muslim, born of Afghan
parents and shall not be a citizen of another country; 2. Shall not be less
than forty years old the day of candidacy; 3. Shall not have been convicted of
crimes against humanity, a criminal act or deprivation of civil rights by court.
No individual shall be elected for more than two terms as President. The
provision of this article shall also apply to Vice-Presidents.
Id. at art. 62.
43. A good example of this was Afghan reaction to the law protecting women’s rights,
with opponents claiming that the law was designed to appease the West. Azam Ahmed &
Habib Zahori, Despite West’s Efforts, Afghan Youths Cling to Traditional Ways, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2013, at A1.
44. See infra Part III.B.
45. Ziba Mir-Hosseini highlights this challenge by declaring:
Muslim jurists claim, and all Muslims believe, that justice and equality are in-
trinsic values and cardinal principles in Islam and the sharia. If this is the
case, in a state that claims to be guided by the sharia, why are justice and
equality not reflected in the laws that regulate gender relations and the rights
of men and women? Why do Islamic jurisprudential texts—which define the
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limited state action because opponents of reform successfully place
the discourse on women’s rights within the “private” realm,46—a space
deemed beyond the reach of government action.47 Thus, increas-
ingly, women’s rights are becoming associated with the affairs of the
family,48 which in Afghan society is the most private of realms.49
Furthermore, the Afghan government is weak, making it dependent
on conservatives and Islamists,50 explaining its willingness if not
need to adopt a conservative agenda while at the same time claim-
ing that international demands for reforms are rooted in an inter-
ventionist anti-Islamic western culture.51 The final pillar is with the
notion of state strength,52 understood through the polysemous concept
terms of the sharia—treat women as second-class citizens and place them
under men’s domination?
Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and
Feminism, 32 CRITICAL INQUIRY 629, 629 (2006).
46. See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM.
J. INT’L L. 613, 625 (1991) (distinguishing between private and public with respect to inter-
national law, and arguing that such a distinction is detrimental to women’s rights). Hanan
Al-Ahmadi’s empirical study of 160 Saudi women leaders, for example, highlights that
structural issues and a lack of investment rather than Islam undermine the promotion of
women in Saudi Arabia. Al-Ahmadi, supra note 38, at 152.
47. Jessica Pfisterer, Letting the Pillar of Society Fall: Failing Health Care and
Maternal Mortality in Afghanistan, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 61, 62 (2011) (highlighting
that the high maternal mortality rate in Afghanistan is linked to the status of women in
the family and society. The implication being that the Afghan government cannot compel
Afghans to ensure that women receive appropriate health care).
48. In a recent case, an Afghan judge allowed three individuals—all family members—
convicted of torturing a child bride to go free, claiming that there was no evidence to show
abuse, even though Sahar Gul by the end of her ordeal could not walk and needed serious
medical attention. Emma Graham-Harrison, Afghan Judges Free Three Jailed for the
Torture of Child Bride Sahar Gul, THE GUARDIAN, July 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2013/jul/11/afghan-judges-free-sahar-guls-torturers, archived at http://perma
.cc/ET9R-GP6L.
49. The private (family) realm is sacred because so much of Afghan life is dependent
on honor, which means that if it is sullied or defamed, it requires an act of violence to
restore the lost honor. THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY 59 (2010).
50. In March 2012, for example, the Afghan Ulema Council issued a statement de-
claring, “[m]en are fundamental and women are secondary.” The statement appeared on
the website of the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, suggesting that he supports
it. The statement led Shukria Barakzai, a female lawmaker from Kabul to assert: “The
government thinks that 2014 is nearing and the foreigners are leaving Afghanistan and
they want to reach out to the Taliban with such statements.” Charles Levinson, Afghan
Women Seen Losing Ground, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2012, at A12.
51. When discussing the case of the Qur’an burning and the killing of 16 Afghan
civilians by a U.S. soldier, Hafez Abdul Qayoom, a member of the Afghan Ulema Council,
stated: “To Muslims, and especially to Afghans, religion is much higher a concern than
civilian or human casualties . . . . When something happens to their religion, they are
much more sensitive and have much stronger reaction to it.” Rod Nordland, When Koran
Burnings Incite Riots and a Mass Murder Doesn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A4.
52. See infra Part I.
96 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:087
of national security.53 Such an approach encourages one to use the
need for state security to challenge those that oppose reform, as ef-
fectively what is argued is that by preventing change opponents of
empowerment seek to keep the state weak and vulnerable.54 The
Paper concludes by arguing that empowering women ensures that
Afghanistan could become a strong, stable state, the principal purpose
of any national security strategy, which “encompasses the decisions
and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from
external threats.” 55 Consequently, to develop a successful campaign
for women’s rights there is a need to rely less on international law,
and even outside actors, as both have little appeal in Afghanistan,
beyond Afghan high society and focus on the Afghan constitution
and shari’a, both of which have the means to end discriminatory
practices.56 An important element is the assumption that the state
and its key organs (including key officials) are not hostile towards
the empowerment of women, but that they are weak, fearful of being
overthrown, and are beholden to conservative forces.57
Part I analyzes the broad principles of state strength holding that
a strong state has a government capable of providing basic security
and services to all people while also preventing a minority from impos-
ing its will on society to the detriment of society.58 Concomitantly, a
strong state protects minorities.59 Nonetheless, defining state strength
in the twenty-first century necessitates moving beyond a realist con-
ception of the state—a state’s ability to resist internal and external
threats by its ability to mobilize its internal resources—as it must
also include a capacity to uphold, promote and protect the ability of
53. P.G. Bock & Morton Berkowitz, The Emerging Field of National Security, 19 WORLD
POL. 122, 124 (1966) (arguing that national security is difficult to define due to institu-
tional proliferation, the technical nature of problems associated with national security and
scholars tackling separate problems in incongruous ways).
54. Ian Boxill draws a link between tourism and national security, highlighting how in-
security undermines tourism, a vital source of income for some states. Boxill is undoubt-
edly correct in his conclusion that when it comes to national security, there is a need for
a holistic approach. Ian Boxill, Linking Tourism Security to National Security: A Brief
Comment on the Implications of the Christopher Coke Saga, 4 WORLDWIDE HOSPITALITY
& TOURISM THEMES 26, 26–28 (2012).
55. Melvyn P. Leffler, National Security, 77 J. AM. HIST. 143, 143 (1990).
56. In 2001, the Bangladeshi high court ruled that religious edicts that prevent women
from voting are illegal. The country’s election commission also announced that it would con-
sider disqualifying candidates who opposed equal political rights. Lipika Pelham, Support
for Bangladesh Female Franchise, BBC NEWS, May 21, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/south_asia/1345020.stm, archived at http://perma.cc/VG7G-7KYL.
57. Kabeer et al., supra note 17, at 21.
58. Michael Mastanduno et al., Toward a Realist Theory of State Action, 33 INT’L STUD.
Q. 457, 462–63 (1989).
59. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights
and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 483, 489 (2002–2003).
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its people to maximize their happiness.60 Thus, the aim is to balance
a Westphalian, westernized conception of state formation with post–
Cold War notions of human security.
Part II examines feminist legal theory, the public-private divide,
which serves as an analytical tool and why the Afghan state is fail-
ing to abide by its constitutional and international commitments.61
The Afghan government depends on local power brokers and conser-
vative elements that are naturally hostile towards the empower-
ment of women.62 Accordingly, women’s participation in any sector
is therefore dependent on the men who are defining spheres in
Afghanistan.63 Thus, for example, membership in the Wolesi Jirga
(Council of People), a public body, is accepted, but the same degree
of tolerance does not infiltrate education or economic empowerment,
often defined as private issues existing within the purview of the
patriarchal family.64 In other words, female participation is not a
basic right, even though gender discrimination is prohibited under
the Afghan Constitution,65 it is accepted because reforms cannot chal-
lenge social or religious practices.66
Part III provides a schematic look at Islam and its relationship
with women to dismiss the notion that Islam is the reason for the sub-
ordination of Afghan women.67 Discriminatory practices and subju-
gation are brought about by the adoption of Islamism—a politicized
60. Cullen S. Hendrix, Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Impli-
cations for the Study of Civil Conflict, 47 PEACE RES. 273, 274 (2010).
61. See, e.g., Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, CEDAW and Afghanistan, 11 J. INT’L
WOMEN STUD. 136, 142 (2009) (recounting the opposition to the CEDAW in Afghanistan
in 2004 and discussing “a clear campaign to discredit the Convention as ‘Western,’ ‘un-
Islamic,’ and incompatible with Afghan culture and religion. This was evident . . . when
questions from the participants [in training sessions] pointed to incorrect information about
the Convention being spread by Imams in communities and the media.”).
62. Id. at 148–50.
63. Jan Harvey, Afghan Women Need Men in Rights Push: Those Who Can Change
Decades of Inequality only Hear Male Voices, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2012, at 18.
64. Farhoumand-Sims, supra note 61, at 144.
65. See infra Part IV.A.1.
66. The religious argument is especially important because under the repugnancy
clause, any law that the Courts deem to offend Islam is invalid as stated in art. 3, “No law
shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.”
CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at art. 3 (2004).
67. Islam ensures that Muslim societies largely resemble one another because of the
adherence to Islam. ERNEST GELLNER, MUSLIM SOCIETY 1–7 (1981). Khaled A. Beydoun,
writing about Saudi Arabia, argues that the interpretation of Islam and the dominance
of Wahhabism rather than Islam prevents women from asserting their position in Saudi
society: “To say that Wahhabism is the ‘established or entangled’ sect in Saudi Arabia is
a severe understatement. Rather, it is the prism by which law and policy is shaped and
ratified; a prism that thoroughly perceives the political participation of women as unholy,
and wholly abhorrent.” Khaled A. Beydoun, Fast Tracking Women into Parliamentary
Seats in the Arab World, 17 SW. J. INT’L L. 63, 82 (2011).
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version of Islam that is highly genderized.68 Contemporary Islamists
engage in a process of coercing an interpretation of an eschewed ver-
sion of Islam that includes cultural and tribal practices that are in-
herently antiwomen.69 The section also reviews the development of
Muslim Feminism under which Muslim women advocate for their
rights through the Qur’an.70 This type of advocacy sometimes places
Muslim women on a collision course with their western counterparts.71
Nevertheless, the views of Muslim feminists play an important role
in the empowerment of women and are at times best suited to chal-
lenge their oppressors.72
Part IV, composed of several subsections, offers an examination
of the position of women in Afghan society. A historical approach
shows that Afghan women have enjoyed certain rights—many of
which were public—that contemporary Afghan society identifies as
existing in the private realm.73 The pervasive sense of insecurity that
befell Afghanistan in the 1970s and enabled men to deny women equal
rights by using contrived religious and cultural norms helps to explain
this transference of rights.74 It is noteworthy that Afghan women
68. See, e.g., Brice Dickson, The United Nations and Freedom of Religion, 44 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 327, 329–30 (1995) (surveying the way the UN has sought to ensure religious
tolerance in preventing or redressing human rights abuses); Tahir Mahmood, Religion in
Contemporary Legal Systems, 2011 BYU L. REV. 605, 605–06, 611 (2011) (on how religion
needs to adapt so that it does not breach international human rights law).
69. L. Elizabeth Chamblee argues that only when Islamists take control of a political
system does the international community becomes involved, arguably because of concerns
relating to security. At the same time, she notes that when the regime introduces and im-
plements legislation that greatly undermines women’s rights the international commu-
nity accepts them if they are described or presented as cultural. Chamblee, supra note
22, at 1075–76 (2003–2004); see also Hunt, supra note 7, at 116; Cherryl Walker, Uneasy
Relations: Women, Gender Equality and Tradition, 115 THESIS ELEVEN, 77, 86–90 (2013)
(noting that in post-apartheid South Africa, traditional rights take precedence over equality
because of internal African National Congress politics).
70. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 45, at 640.
71. See infra Part II.
72. This is where Article 22 of the Constitution is useful because it prohibits discrim-
ination against any Afghan citizen and emphasizes that every Afghan citizen—man and
woman—has equal rights before the law. CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at art. 22 (2004).
Nusrat Choudhury further argues that the Afghan Constitution, through Article 22 and
Article 7, which refers to Afghanistan’s international obligations, allows secular Afghan
women advocates to call on the parliament to adopt legislation in line with the govern-
ment’s obligation under Article 7. Conversely, Muslim feminists may use the Constitution’s
Islamic provisions to call on Parliament to adopt legislation that provides women with
rights as decreed by Islam. Nusrat Choudhury, Constrained Spaces for Islamic Feminism:
Women’s Rights and the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155,
175–76 (2007–2008).
73. See Elizabeth Thompson, Public and Private in Middle Eastern Women’s History,
15 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 52, 56–59 (2003).
74. See infra Part IV.
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serve as the barometer of a man’s honor.75 In other words, a man’s
honor is dependent on the “purity” of his female relation.76 The sec-
tion proceeds to examine how Afghan women have fared under the
newly adopted constitution and how the Supreme Court has imple-
mented the constitution with respect to women. The final two sub-
sections review the role of the Afghan Ministry of Women and Afghan
NGOs, both of which endeavor to promote women’s rights.77 These
two areas are important because the Ministry clearly operates in the
public space while the NGO sector negotiates between public and pri-
vate spaces.78 Looking at the Ministry and the NGO sector facilitates
a closer examination of the role of Afghan feminism; it mirrors current
debates about feminism in the Muslim World that remain bifurcated
between Muslim Feminism, which follows traditional liberal feminism,
and Islamic Feminism, which argues for a Qur’anic approach to gen-
der issues.79 While some advocate for an Islamic approach to women’s
rights, others embrace international human rights norms as their
mantra.80 Rahela Hashim Sidiqi, a senior adviser at Afghanistan’s
civil service commission summed up the challenge by noting that
Afghan feminism is not about overturning cultural norms, but rather
about humanizing it—“ ‘If it shows respect to wear a scarf . . . I wear
a scarf.’ ” 81 Finally, the importance of the Afghan Ministry of Women
and of the Afghan NGO sector has increased because there has been
greater attention afforded to women’s issues.82 This may explain
why the Taliban targets women working for these institutions.83 The
Taliban has come to recognize that many Afghans see the value of
75. Huma Ahmed-Ghosh declares: “The honor of the family, the tribe, and ultimately
the nation is invested in women.” Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, A History of Women in Afghani-
stan: Lessons Learnt for the Future, Or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan,
4 J. INT’L WOMEN STUD. 1, 3 (2003) [hereinafter Ahmed-Ghosh, Lessons].
76. See id. at 2–3.
77. See infra Parts IV.A.3–B.
78. See infra Part IV.B.
79. See infra Part II.
80. See Chamblee, supra note 22, at 1105, 1115, 1129.
81. Michael Gerson, An Afghan Feminism, WASH. POST, July 10, 2009, at A23; see
also Harvey, supra note 63, at 18.
82. Ahmed-Ghosh, Lessons, supra note 75, at 12.
83. Reportedly, from 2011 to 2012 there was a 12 percent reduction in civilian casu-
alties overall, but a 20 percent increase in injuries to women and girls. The most striking
statistic was the 700 percent increase in the number of government employees targeted
by the Taliban. Golnar Motevalli, Taliban Targeting Afghan Women and Government
Workers, UN Report Finds, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 19, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk
/world/2013/feb/19/taliban-targeting-women-un-report, archived at http://perma.cc/9X9T
-R2FT; see also Anup Kaphle, List of Prominent Afghan Officials Assassinated (and
Targeted) in 2012, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/worldviews/wp/2012/12/10/list-of-prominent-afghan-officials-assassinated-and-targeted
-in-2012/, archived at http://perma.cc/XD45-P968.
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incorporating women into the public sphere so they now seek to under-
mine the process of women’s empowerment by targeting women,84
schools85 and health facilities.86 It would therefore serve as a testa-
ment to the strength of the state if it withstands the assault on the
rights of Afghan women.87 Thus, the aim of these two subsections is
to highlight through a short narrative and anecdotal evidence the
limitations and successes of the Afghan Ministry of Women and of
the Afghan NGO sector in promoting women’s rights.
I. STATE STRENGTH: MOBILIZATION OF
RESOURCES & UTILITARIANISM
A central feature in international relations is the state.88 A realist
conception of state strength focuses on power and the state and less
about the people living in the state.89 Consequently, realists tend to
focus on capacity, albeit military: the ability of the state to deter or
repel challenges to its authority; bureaucratic administrative capacity
(the ability of the state to collect and manage information); and, qual-
ity and coherence of political institutions.90 Such a conception of the
state adheres to the view that a strong state is one that is able to
mobilize and extract resources within its territory providing it with
power and wealth that in turn lead to security for the state and its
people.91 Put differently, a state that cannot mobilize and extract
resources is perceived as weak and ripe for external intervention as
others seek to exploit its weakness for their own national interest.92
Thus, although there is more debate concerning weak states as such
84. Thomas H. Johnson, Taliban Adaptations and Innovations, 24 SMALL WARS &
INSURGENCIES 3, 4–5, 19 (2013) (reviewing the ability of the Taliban to adapt its tactics to
attain its agenda).
85. Annabel Symington, Schoolgirls Struggle Back to Normality After Taliban Attack,
IRISH TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013.
86. Suicide Bombers Target Hospital, Markets, Killing 38, Wounding 100, NANAIMO
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 15, 2012, at A10.
87. See Ahmed-Ghosh, Lessons, supra note 75, at 11.
88. Ian Brownlie defines the state as having the following elements: a defined terri-
tory, a permanent population and an effective government. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 73–76 (3rd ed. 1979); see also HANS J. MORGENTHAU &
KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
(1985, 6th ed.).
89. Mastanduno et al., supra note 58, at 461–63.
90. Hendrix, supra note 60, at 274, 283. Stuart Eizenstat, John Porter and Jeremy
Weinstein measure “weak,” “failing” and “failed” states using three criteria: security, the
ability to provide basic services and the protection of civil rights. Stuart Eizenstat et al.,
Rebuilding Weak States, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 134, 136 (2005); Stewart Patrick, Weak States
and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?, 29 WASH. Q. 27, 29 (2006).
91. Mastanduno et al., supra note 58, at 462–63.
92. See id. at 470.
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states have not descended into the abyss of lawlessness, chaos and
insecurity are often equated with failed states.93 A weak state may
have a government and the ability to provide some security, maintain
general control over its borders, provide some public services, and sign
onto or even fulfill elements of international agreements,94 however,
it is weak in terms of its ability to operate within well-established
parameters (a defined rule of law system that is uniformly and neu-
trally implemented and imposed).95 The state imposes its will when
it needs to and often relies on the military to exercise its will.96 The
state’s capacity to provide basic services, functions and goods is greatly
limited, while government authority is restricted by its own recogni-
tion that it governs at the will of select and powerful groups who may
opt to undermine the government when they deem it as a threat to
a group’s interest.97 Moreover, in weak states, government stability
and longevity is fickle, as their primary concern is survival. This
may explain why they make unsavory deals.98 Transition typically
occurs through non-political means—revolutions or coups as opposed
to the ballot box.99 This therefore raises questions concerning good
governance defined by internationally recognized standards of ac-
countability, transparency and anticorruption. Hallmarks of good
governance include basic security, the protection of human rights,
economic liberalization, concentrated or structured public sector
spending, democratization, civil society, and other priorities such as
health care and education.100
Another approach in determining state strength is utilitarianism,
understood in terms of the action that one takes, or more specifically,
93. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner assert that a failed state is “utterly incapable
of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.” Gerald B. Helman &
Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 3, 3 (1992–1993), available at
http://www.foriegnpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/saving_failed_states, archived at http://
perma.cc/ZGF7-7NRE.
94. For Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, African states epitomize the weak state
typology; they endure political instability and are economically weak, but they retain
their statehood. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa’s Weak States Persist:
The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35 WORLD POL. 1, 1 (1982).
95. See id. at 6.
96. See id. at 7–8.
97. See id. at 8.
98. The situation in post–civil war Yemen is a case in point, as even though South
Yemen had more progressive legislation in relation to family law and women’s rights, once
the two Yemens became united, the South Yemenis accepted the North’s more religious
orientation. There are two explanations for this stance: peace was more important or be-
cause it allowed men in the South to enter into polygamous unions, something that they
could not do when South Yemen was independent. Maxine Molyneux, Women’s Rights and
Political Contingency: The Case of Yemen, 1990–1994, 49 MIDDLE E. J. 418, 420 (1995).
99. Patrick, supra note 90, at 31.
100. Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Governance, 50
INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 105, 112 (1998).
102 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:087
the view that the right action is the one that maximizes a good with
human security.101 The former underlines desirable actions whose
purpose is to maximize happiness;102 whereas, the latter focuses on
individuals and two basic rights viewed through a freedom lens: free-
dom from want and freedom from fear.103 Accordingly, for utilitarians
an action is right or wrong depending on the amount of harm it would
cause as a relational concept and the consequences that would come
from the action;104 whereas, for human rights advocates a society that
creates, recognizes, defends and promotes rights is strong because
individuals have equal treatment and are willing to accept the duties
of citizenship.105
When applied to a post-conflict setting, the process begins by first
recognizing that the state is weak, mainly because the conflict had
undermined if not destroyed state institutions in addition to norma-
tive values that the society may have held prior to the conflict.106 In
developing the human rights agenda, the state therefore has to iden-
tify basic rights and equality of rights—human rights of equal value—
which are then codified.107 The next step is upholding those rights,
necessitating a distinction between rhetoric and action, as some may
support certain actions, including ratification of international norms,
but in reality they ignore their obligations.108 Thus, one of the key chal-
lenges for a society transitioning out of conflict is to reintroduce and
to an extent even impose a system of law (rule of law), but to maintain
respect for the law because as Jaime Malamud-Goti, the former ad-
visor in human rights and legal matters to President Raul Alfonsin
writes, “a rights-based democratic society constitutes the requisite
environment in which individuals can flourish.”109
In sum, a realist-utilitarian-influenced approach to defining state
strength recognizes that the state has to maximize its capacity as a
101. R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and Moral Rights, 14 CANADIAN J. PHILOSOPHY, 1,
5 (1984).
102. Id. at 2–3.
103. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994
3, 26–33 (1994) (providing the first definition of human security).
104. A. C. Ewing, Utilitarianism, 58 ETHICS 100, 102 (1948).
105. Francis M. Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty: A Framework of Protection, Assistance,
and Development for the Internally Displaced, 8 LEIDEN J. INT’L L., 249, 258 (1995).
106. See id. at 271.
107. Vrinda Narain, Muslim Women’s Equality in India: Applying a Human Rights
Framework, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 91, 91–103 (2013) (evaluating the potential of a human
rights framework to serve as an analytical tool in assessing Muslim women’s exclusion
in India); Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 281,
282–83 (2007).
108. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 1947 (2001–2002).
109. Jaime Malamud-Goti, Punishment and a Rights-Based Democracy, 10 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 3, 5 (1991).
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way to provide security, which it accomplishes through the promotion
of equality, which lies at the heart of human rights.110 Such a view
demands that the state and specifically its institutions do all that
they can to pursue, promote and protect the human rights of all of
the inhabitants as only through such an approach could happiness,
and by extension security, be attained for all.111
II. FEMINISM, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, GENDER
DISCRIMINATION & INTERNATIONAL LAW
Throughout the twentieth century, interest in promoting, pro-
tecting, and preserving women’s fundamental rights increased.112 The
campaign to end gender discrimination received a major boost once
governments adopted legislation, mechanisms, and norms that not
only granted women rights that they had been denied, but also en-
hanced their personal security and status in society.113 Across the
western world, governments adopted aggressive antidiscriminatory
legislation and other measures designed to promote equality and the
ending of unfair practices.114 In non-Western societies, changes with
respect to the need to acknowledge women’s rights as human rights
was and has been difficult because some societies have customary
and cultural values which rebuff equality values, especially concern-
ing women’s.115 This dichotomy is evident in the discourse among
110. See supra notes 88–108 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. An unprecedented level of discussion about women’s issues took place in the 1990s,
especially with the Beijing Platform (1995) and Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).
See Rhonda Copelon, Introduction: Bringing Beijing Home, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 599, 601–
03 (1996) (highlighting the significant conceptual progress that has occurred with respect
to women’s rights, particularly the international recognition at Beijing that “ ‘women’s
rights are human rights’ ”).
113. See, e.g., Gayle Binion, Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective, 17 HUM. RTS. Q.
509, 512–13 (1995) (exploring a women-based approach to understanding human rights
that recognizes that women’s experiences vary and feminism is multilayered).
114. See Sex Discrimination Act (SDA), 1975, 65 (covering sex and married persons dis-
crimination in a UK legislative act); see also Equal Pay Act (EPA), 1970, 41 (prohibiting
unequal pay when women perform the same or comparable work to that performed by men
in the UK); Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 42 U.S.C. §§ 701–18 (2014) (prohibiting
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Equal
Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d)–62 (protecting men and women who perform
substantially equal work in the same establishment from sex-based wage discrimination).
In addition to legislation, states have also created commissions, such as the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (USA), to oversee racial or gender-based equality. See U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov, archived at http://
perma.cc/LTY2-ACBS.
115. See Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural
Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 838, 839, 843–44
(2000) (examining the challenge of balancing universal rights with cultural traditions);
Ndulo, supra note 10, at 87, 89 (examining the place of African customary law in an African
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liberal feminists,116 intersectional feminists,117 and anti-essentialist
feminists.118 Radhika Coomaraswamy, the former Special Rapporteur
on Violence against Women captures this in her analysis of identity:
For many women, their sense of identity arises as a result [of]
their experience as women, living within groups primarily gov-
erned by men. Though their sense of self and dignity comes from
how the wider society treats women, they often have to face dis-
crimination within local groups. They may have to submit to dis-
criminatory practices and laws, as well engage in rituals, customs,
and habits that reinscribe the subordinate status of women within
the hierarchy of their religious, ethnic, or tribal identity. Many
women acquiesce because they see their group identity as the most
important aspect of their lives. Others resist, only to be branded
as traitors or “bad women” who bring the group into disrepute.119
With the development of the process of addressing gender in-
equality, feminism and feminist legal theory became more sundry and
interesting, as feminism evolved, though a shared basis remains: the
need to recognize the intrinsic inequity that women face in a male-
dominant society.120 The key strands identified within feminism are:
legal system and the tensions that exist between African customary law and both domestic
and international human rights norms).
116. Susan Wendell describes the focus of liberal feminism as “equality of opportunity.”
Liberal feminists promote the idea of equal legal rights for women and an end to State dis-
crimination. Their commitment to education and the law places the State at the epicenter
of liberal feminism. Susan Wendell, A (Qualified) Defense of Liberal Feminism, 2 HYPATIA
65, 65–66 (1987). See also Valerie Bryson, Men and Sex Equality: What Have They Got to
Lose?, 20 POL. 3, 3, 6, 8 (2000) (arguing that because genuine gender equality may result
in short-term losses for men, even though it will benefit them in the long run, men cannot
be trusted to embrace gender equality and women must remain active).
117. Intersectional feminists challenge the notion of a single feminist discourse, calling
attention to the role of both race and sex in the experiences of Black women. See Kimberlé
Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF
LAW 195, 212–13 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990); Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and
Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16,
16–17 (1995) (providing a review of anti-essentialism and intersectionalism).
118. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 585, 615–16 (1989–1990) (noting that anti-essentialism acknowledges the
failure of liberal feminist discourse to address the issue of race and rejects the idea of a
single female voice).
119. Coomaraswamy, supra note 59, at 484.
120. Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 157, 157–58 (2010–2011) (reviewing the evolution of feminism). See also Rosalind
Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L & GENDER 277, 277–
78 (2008). Coomaraswamy also highlights the natural tension that exists between northern
and southern women. She asks:
In a world where western imperialism has historically been the champion of
third world females in Asia or Africa, the struggle for women’s rights ac-
quires another dimension. How does one fight for women’s rights without
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liberal feminists, cultural feminists, radical feminists and third-wave
feminists.121 Liberal feminists concentrate on challenging jurisdic-
tional boundaries within society and a recognition that certain issues
are private and others public.122 Ultimately, liberal feminists call for
equal entitlement and an end to discriminatory practices through
legislation.123 Cultural feminists isolate the source of gender injustice
in the way society portrays masculine and feminine roles that lead
to the devaluation of feminine roles.124 Radical feminists stress that
inequality comes from the subjugation of women by men, through
sexuality—understood as a social process that desires, generates,
directs, conveys and forms the person.125 Third-wave feminism,126
champions a commitment to freedom, equality, justice and self-
actualization.127 There are three main tactical disparities between
being complicit in the racism and prejudice that characterizes Northern atti-
tudes toward Southern countries or the majority-minority dynamics within
particular societies?
Coomaraswamy, supra note 59, at 484.
121. Cf. Chamallas, supra note 120, at 157–58.
122. See id. at 625–26 (distinguishing between private and public with respect to inter-
national law, and arguing that such a distinction is detrimental to women’s rights); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV 451, 451–53 (1977–
1978) (arguing the need for an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution and woman’s
rights under the laws); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the
Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 10–11, 18, 21 (1989);
Wendell, supra note 116, at 66.
123. Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 25–26 (1990) (analyzing existing and
emerging feminist themes that dominate contemporary legal discourse); see also Carol
Pressman, The House that Ruth Built: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and Justice,
14 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 329–30 (1997–1998) (recognizing Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
appreciation of the fact that men and women need not be the same to be treated equally).
124. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 5–6 (1982).
125. Catharine A. MacKinnon notes:
As work is to Marxism, sexuality to feminism is socially constructed yet con-
structing, universal as activity yet historically specific, jointly comprised of
matter and mind. As the organized expropriation of the work of some for the
benefit of others defines a class—workers—the organized expropriation of
the sexuality of some for the use of others defines the sex, woman. Hetero-
sexuality is its structure, gender and family its congealed forms, sex roles
its qualities generalized to social persona, reproduction a consequence, and
control its issue.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 516 (1982).
126. See Rita Alfonso & Jo Trigilio, Surfing the Third Wave: A Dialogue Between Two
Third Wave Feminists, 12 HYPATIA 7, 7–10 (1997); Amber E. Kinser, Negotiating Spaces
For/Through Third-Wave Feminism, 16 NWSA J. 124, 124, 131, 133, 135, 147 (2004);
Deborah L. Siegel, The Legacy of the Personal: Generating Theory in Feminism’s Third
Wave, 12 HYPATIA 46, 46, 51, 56, 58 (1997).
127. Stacy Gillis, Gillian Howie and Rebecca Munford write that first-generation femi-
nism was a response to the political, social, economic and public exclusion of women.
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second and the third-wave feminists. First, third-wave feminists
use “personal narratives to illustrate an intersectional and multi-
perspective vision of feminism.”128 Second and third-wave feminists,
instead of synthesizing action and theoretical justification, embraced
a multivocal approach that does not rest on the category of “woman”
but rather takes multivocality, inclusiveness and non-judgmental
approaches in constructing its analysis.129
It is within third-wave feminism that one finds the clearest mani-
festation of Muslim feminism, as it argues for a female presence with-
in Islam.130 Nonetheless, there are two discernable, distinctive strands
of Muslim feminism: secular feminism131 and Islamist feminism.132
The latter “draws on and is constituted by multiple discourses includ-
ing secular nationalist, Islamic modernist, humanitarian/human
rights, and democratic” discourses.133 Conversely, “Islamic feminism
is expressed in a single or paramount religiously grounded discourse
Second-generation feminists sought greater social inclusion, concentrating on issues of
motherhood, reproduction, sexual violence and sexual expression. Third-generation
feminists focus on their “otherness” from the previous generations. Stacy Gillis et al.,
Introduction, in THIRD WAVE FEMINISM: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION xxi–xxiv (Stacy Gillis
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
128. R. Claire Snyder, What is Third-Wave Feminism?: A New Directions Essay, 34
SIGNS 175, 175–76, 184 (2008).
129. Id. at 175–76, 192 (2008) (highlighting the differences between second and third-
generation feminism and asserting “[t]hird wave feminism rejects grand narratives for a
feminism that operates as a hermeneutics of critique within a wide array of discursive loca-
tions, and replaces attempts at unity with a dynamic and welcoming politics of coalition”);
see also Siegel, supra note 126, at 51. Miriam Cooke’s conception of the Muslim woman
typifies this approach; she integrates gender and religion because she views the two as one.
See Miriam Cooke, The Muslimwoman, 1 CONT. ISLAM 139, 139–40 (2007); Miriam Cooke,
Deploying the Muslimwoman, 24 J. FEM. STUD. IN RELIGION 91 (2008).
130. See Sherin Saadallah, Muslim Feminism in the Third Wave: A Reflective Inquiry,
in THIRD WAVE FEMINISM: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION 216, 218 (Stacy Gillis et al. eds., 2d ed.
2007); see also Margot Badran, Understanding Islam, Islamism, and Islamic Feminism, 13
J. WOMEN’S HIST. 47, 47, 51 (2001) [hereinafter Badran, Understanding Islam] (rejecting
the claim that religion is bad for women).
131. Valentine M. Moghadam describes secular feminism as a rejection of religion
because it is based in “laws, policies, or institutions” and calls for critical analysis of
religion. Valentine M. Moghadam, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: A Secularist
Interpretation, 13 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 42, 43–45 (2001).
132. See Shahrzad Mojab, Theorizing the Politics of ‘Islamic Feminism,’ 69 FEMINIST
REV. 124, 124, 131 (2001); see also Valentine M. Moghadam, Islamic Feminism and Its
Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate, 27 SIGNS 1135, 1142–44, 1156–57, 1163
(2002) (recognizing the presence of Islamic feminism and secular feminism while arguing
for synergy to move the debate forward).
133. Fereshteh Ahmadi, Islamic Feminism in Iran: Feminism in a New Islamic Context,
22 J. FEMINIST STUD. 33, 33, 50 (2006) (highlighting how Iranian feminists use holy text to
reexamine the role of women in Islam and by extension in Iran); Margot Badran, Between
Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflections on the Middle East and Beyond, 1 J.
MIDDLE E. WOMEN’S STUD. 6, 6 (2005) [hereinafter Badran, Between Secular and Islamic
Feminism/s]; see also Badran, Understanding Islam, supra note 130, at 48–49 (arguing
for a wider approach to what is Islamism, specifically from a gender perspective).
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taking the Qur’an as its central text.”134 The 1979 Iranian revolution
accentuated this dichotomy,135 generating space for a fresh dialogue
between Islam, feminism and women as Iranian women envisioned
the revolution as “a catalyst for the emergence of new reformist and
feminist voices in Islam that are changing the terms of reference of
Islamic discourses from within.”136
Recognizing the historical debate within the Muslim community
about the role of feminism in society highlights that Muslim women,
both Islamists and liberals, have always demanded and continue to
demand recognition not only of their rights, but also of their position
in society as women, nationalists, mothers, wives and workers.137
Moreover, the debate surrounding feminism and Islam validates the
conclusions of Irfan Ahmad’s study of Jamaat-e-Islami: “[I]t is not the
Qur’an per se, which legitimates gender hierarchy, but the person
making interpretation thereof and the context in which it is done.”138
***
The process of identifying and inaugurating a women’s interna-
tional human rights regime arose with the adoption of the Convention
on the Declaration of Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW).139 The Convention, while focusing on ending discriminatory
practices against women in the private and the public spheres, has
also had to contend with the gendered nature of international law140
134. Badran, Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s, supra note 133, at 6.
135. Nahid Yeganeh, Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Dis-
course in Iran, 44 FEMINIST REV. 3 (1993). Margot Badran highlights the unique way in
which feminism developed in the Middle East, asserting that while the initial focus of
Western feminists was equal gender rights, Middle Eastern women’s movements were
involved in national liberation, which meant that political rights became infused with per-
sonal (citizen) status rights. However, as the post-colonial Middle East state developed,
religion slowly seeped into the discourse. Margot Badran, Unifying Women: Feminist Pasts
and Presents in Yemen, 10 GENDER & HIST. 498, 498–500 (1998).
136. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 45, at 631 (2006); see also Yeganeh, supra note 135, at
16–17 (arguing that the Iranian Islamic revolution had promised women participation, but
in reality “undermined [women’s] position within the family and violated their individual
and human rights”).
137. Badran, Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s, supra note 133, at 6; see also
Nawar Al-Hassan Golley, Is Feminism Relevant to Arab Women?, 25 THIRD WORLD Q.
521, 526 (2004).
138. Irfan Ahmed, Cracks in the “Mightiest Fortress”: Jamaat-e-Islami’s Changing
Discourse on Women, 42 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 549, 551 (2008).
139. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2244
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MN39-8RG2 [hereinafter CEDAW].
140. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention declares: “Women shall be especially
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prosti-
tution, or any form of indecent assault.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The phrasing
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and social and cultural norms that permit discriminatory practices
and attitudes.141 A number of Muslim states took the position, for
example, that the application of Article 2142 challenges shari’a and,
therefore, their social, political and civil systems.143 Prima facie, the
issue for a number of Muslim states with certain international legal
norms can be attributed to the idea of a public-private sphere, which
Muslim states consider a western concept alien to Islamist144 society
because of its close association with modernity.145
suggests that the offense of rape, though committed against a woman, is viewed not as
an act of violence, but rather as a crime against the family. See Rhonda Copelon, Gender
Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal
Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217, 200–21 (2000–2001) (explaining further that international rape
as a crime, descried males relatedness to a female victim, offending ego and/or the family).
141. In its Preamble, CEDAW calls for “a change in the traditional role of men as well
as the role of women in society and in the family.” CEDAW argues that changing tra-
ditional conceptions renders equality between men and women possible. In doing so, it
recognizes that traditional norms, especially those related to the family and children,
have allowed for discriminatory practices. CEDAW, supra note 139. See also the UN
General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, which rec-
ognizes that:
violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full ad-
vancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position
compared with men. . . .
G.A. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20, 1993).
142. Numerous countries attached reservations to Article 2, which provides:
State Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree
to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: (a) To embody the
principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions
or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure,
through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this
principle; (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with
men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public in-
stitutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination;
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in con-
formity with this obligation; (e) To take all appropriate measures to elimi-
nate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise;
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimi-
nation against women; (g) To repeal all national penal provisions which consti-
tute discrimination against women.
CEDAW, supra note 139, at art. 2.
143. Urfan Khaliq, Beyond The Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Women’s Con-
vention in the Law as Stipulated in Shari’ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 1, 12–13, 18, 21 (1995).
144. See infra Part III.A.
145. Nilufer Gole, Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries, 14 PUB.
CULTURE 173, 173, 175, 187–88 (2002) (noting that the growing visibility of Islam is
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Much of the debate about women’s rights also appears in dis-
cussions of cultural rights and the rights of indigenous communi-
ties to sustain traditional norms, some of which counter the idea of
equality.146 Article 5 of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, for example, declares: “Indigenous peoples have
the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, eco-
nomic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and
cultural life of the State.”147 This stands in contrast to Article 3 of the
International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, which holds:
“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and polit-
ical rights set forth in the present Covenant.”148 Ominously, the dichot-
omy tends to impact women more than men149 as men, due to their
position in society, govern, control and structure the norms, allowing
them to adopt measures that uphold the discriminatory practices.150
Feminist engagement with international law arguably peaked in
the 1990s through international meetings, coupled with changes in
international criminal law that led to the recognition of sexual violence
leading to an eruption of religious-based discussions in which Muslims strive to address
the challenges of modernity).
146. See id. at 185.
147. The Declaration’s Preamble also recognizes “that indigenous peoples have suffered
from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their
lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their
right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.” G.A. Res., 61/295
U.N. Doc., A/RES/61/295 at 2, 4, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/59YL-9G6Q.
148. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966).
149. This is most apparent with respect to marriage and the rights of indigenous women
who marry outside of the community. Radhika Coomaraswamy points out that, in the case
of Sandra Lovelace, the Human Rights Committee opted not to “delve into issues that
would require the right to equality on the part of women to trump the right to culture” be-
cause “[f]or indigenous people, there exists a serious question of survival. Free marriage
across boundaries may result in their assimilation and disappearance. Tribes have tried to
control this possibility by limiting the marriage options of their women.” Coomaraswamy,
supra note 59, at 500.
150. Nadine Puechguirbal, for example, demonstrates how male power is sustained by
consistently defining women as vulnerable individuals. Nadine Puechguirbal, Discourses
on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents, 17
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 172, 172–73 (2010). Eleanor A. Doumato describes how the Saudi
government reacted to a women’s driving demonstration in November 1990. The Interior
Ministry, led by Prince Naif, supported the mutawwi’in (religious police). The government,
first issued a ban on all political activity by women, followed by a fatwa by Shaykh ‘Abd
Allah ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz from the government-sponsored Directorate of Islamic
Research, Ruling, Propaganda and Guidance claiming that shari’a prohibits women from
driving. The government also confiscated the passports of the husbands of the women who
had demonstrated and others were suspended from government employment. Eleanor A.
Doumato, Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia, 19 BRITISH J. MIDDLE
E. STUD. 31, 31–32 (1992).
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as an international crime.151 Pinnacle moments with respect to inter-
national law and women’s rights include the unanimous adoption of
Security Council Resolution 1325152 and the Rome Statute, both of
which incorporate sexual violence as an international crime.153 These
measures heightened the need to espouse, promote and accept a gen-
der regime.154 The adoption of Security Council resolutions 1325,155
1820,156 and 1889157 presented a new language that recognized women
as “subjects of international law, enjoying autonomy and rights,” as
opposed to vulnerable victims.158 Security Council Resolution 1325
also promoted institutional change by insisting on the integration of
a gender perspective in UN peace and security work.159 By mandat-
ing consciousness of gender issues, the resolutions empowered local
women’s groups.160
The claim that Islam must permeate every aspect of the state
makes application of the public-private divide exceedingly difficult
in many Islamic states. This view rises from a distinctive Islamist161
jurisprudence that maintains that religion lies at the epicenter of
everything.162 And yet, because Muslim states have been willing to
151. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin et al., Criminal Justice for Gendered Violence and Beyond,
11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 425, 432–37 (2011); Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and
Other Gender-Related Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring
Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 295, 346–49 (2003); Economic and Social Council,
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Submitted by Rene Degni-Segui, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 (Jan. 29, 1996), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/com
mission/country52/68-rwa.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/RJ4P-58EG; The Prosecutor
v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://www.unictr
.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/7ETA-44UJ.
152. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
153. Significantly, the Rome Statute does not recognize rape and sexual violence as
standalone crimes, but as a subset of genocide (Article 6(d)—“Imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group;”); a crime against humanity (Article 7(g)—
“Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;”); or a war crime (Article 8(b)(xxii)—
“Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy”). Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (June 15, 1998) [hereinafter
Rome Statute]; see also S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 152.
154. Rome Statute, supra note 153.
155. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 152.
156. S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
157. S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009).
158. Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International Law
Through the UN Security Council, 32 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 97, 103 (2010).
159. See, e.g., Nadine Puechguirbal, Gender Training for Peacekeepers: Lessons from
the DRC, 10 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 113, 114 (2003).
160. Otto, supra note 158, at 118–19; Elisabeth Porter, Women, Political Decision-
Making, and Peace-Building, 15 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 245, 254–55 (2003).
161. See infra Part III.B.
162. See, e.g., ABUL A’LA MAUDUDI, THE RELIGION OF TRUTH 2–8 (Misbahul Islam Faruqi
ed., 1970).
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adopt international human rights agreements, including conven-
tions demanding gender equality, others claim that the rights ac-
corded under these treaties are only for the public sphere and not
the private.163 Opposition towards a typically gender-neutral under-
standing of international human rights law and a pledge to main-
tain the separation between private and public spaces incentivizes
conservatives to locate issues within the private sphere into which
such rights arguably do not extend.164 The roots of this approach lies
in the early anti-colonial movement during which conservative groups
continued to demand that women maintain traditions.165 For conserva-
tive groups, “[t]he private was seen as the space for women who would
keep the family insulated from the pressures of the public colonial
world. Women then became the custodians of the culture of ethnic,
religious, and tribal groups.”166
In contemporary society, numerous Islamic states,167 including
Afghanistan, sustain a division between the public and private.168
163. Donna Arzt, for example, notes the opposition of the Saudi delegate to Article 18 of
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. The Saudi delegate argued that
the prohibition against coercion regarding the practice of one’s chosen religion raised doubt
among those for whom religion is a way of life. Addressing the conventions on women,
Arzt points out that the Saudi delegates to the UN in 1948 also opposed provisions on
women’s rights, arguing that Islamic law addresses these rights and that marriage should
not be burdened by international requirements that call for wives to be of full age and
enjoy equal rights. Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law
in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 202, 217–19 (1990). See also Theresa Perkins, Note,
Unveiling Muslim Women: The Constitutionality of Hijab Restrictions in Turkey, Tunisia
and Kosovo, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 529, 562–64 (2012) (pointing out how Kosovo, Tunisia and
Turkey have adhered to and at times manipulated international human rights law in rela-
tion to religious veiling).
164. See infra Part III.A.
165. See Badran, Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s, supra note 133, at 6–7.
166. Coomaraswamy, supra note 59, at 487. Adrien Wing writes: “custom and customary
law in the Palestinian community are based upon patriarchy that has resulted in women’s
continued social and legal subordination. Men govern the public and private lives of
women, often limiting them to their historical roles as nurturers and repositories of family
honor.” Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future Legal Status
of Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 149, 157 (1994).
167. An Islamic State is understood as a state that places Islam at its epicenter.
Pakistan is a fitting example of an Islamic state. It began as an Islamic Republic (or a
Muslim State) and later turned into an Islamic State in 1973. Ziring distinguishes the
two, asserting that an Islamic Republic separates religion from politics and government as
it stresses the need for a secular, constitutional government and society, while an Islamic
State governs along Islamic precepts, rejecting the values that the Islamic Republic es-
pouses. Lawrence Ziring, From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan, 24 ASIAN
SURV. 931, 931–32 (1984).
168. This was made abundantly clear under Taliban rule; women had to wear the veil
in public even though the veil is arguably a religious symbol. Anastasia Telesetsky, In
the Shadows and Behind the Veil: Women in Afghanistan Under the Taliban Rule, 13
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 293 (1998). However, as Perkins explains women wear the veil for
a number of reasons, including community identification, tradition, and as a personal
choice. Perkins, supra note 163, at 533–36.
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This type of behavior is most visible when it comes to the enactment
of laws that view whom domestic actors as secular or western, which
leads the government to adopt the CEDAW albeit with reservations.169
Nonetheless, measures that address the private sphere—marriage,
inheritance, divorce, custody, etcetera—are characterized not only
by a demand but a commitment to keep the state out.170 As Professor
Asifa Quraishi, a scholar and activist in the field of Islamic Law and
women notes: “when shari’a-based legislation is opposed as contrary
to international rights norms, such opposition often triggers an al-
most knee-jerk reaction among many Muslims to fiercely defend
these laws as if they were defending their religion itself against a
crusade-like attack.”171 Quraishi therefore argues that the reaction
is often more about repudiating the international community than
it is about Islamic law, which suggests that one has to work with
Islamic jurist and shari’a courts172 though not with the neoliberal
international system.173
III. ISLAM, WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMISM
This section highlights that Islam is not hostile to women and
women’s rights, but that the combination of tribal and patriarchal
norms buoyed by contrived interpretation of Islamic law and empow-
ered by the rise of Islamism—political Islam174—fuels misogyny.175
169. Venkatraman, supra note 35, at 1950–51, 2000–06 (defending the reservation that
a number of Muslim states attached to CEDAW because the convention encapsulates in-
herent cultural bias with respect to Muslim-majority states).
170. SARDAR ALI, supra note 31, at 93–94.
171. Asifa Quraishi, What if Sharia Weren’t the Enemy?: Rethinking International
Women’s Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 175 (2011).
172. Ayesha Imam, a member of the international solidarity network Women Living
Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) and founding director of BAOBAB For Women’s Human
Rights, argues that the way to advance women’s rights and protection is through Muslim
Law. She further notes that the involvement of the international community and of inter-
national human rights may be detrimental to the cause. Ayesha Imam, Working Within
Nigeria’s Sharia Courts Human Rights Dialogue 2.10 (Fall 2003): “Violence Against
Women,” CARNEGIE COUNCIL (2003), https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publication/archive
/dialogue/2-10articles/1053.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M6MZ-G845; see also Ayesha
Iman, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.carnigiecouncil.org/people/data
/ayesia_iman.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L57W-9ZCX.
173. For a critique of the international community and its approach to peacebuilding
see Roger Mac Ginty, Routine Peace: Technocracy and Peacebuilding, 47 COOPERATION
& CONFLICT 287, 290–91 (2012) (highlighting how bureaucratization and institution-
alism help promote neoliberal values in peacebuilding, often at the interests of local
communities); see also Oliver P. Richmond, The Legacy of State Formation Theory for
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 20 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 299, 299–300 (2013) (noting
the role of power and realist conception of the state when it comes to liberal peacebuilding).
174. See infra Part III.A.
175. See Mir-Hosseini, supra note 45, at 629 (noting that the Iranian Islamic revolution
betrayed women by subverting their rights and denying them justice); Sayeh & Morse,
supra note 35, at 313 (challenging the assumption that Islam is the cause of the limited
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Conservatives, who view empowerment policies as a challenge to
Islamic, tribal and cultural norms, take the view that the policies
much be coached as private space issues,176 which therefore leads to
the argument that opposition is not based on gender but rather on
a need to remain true to one’s culture or religion.177 Thus, critical to
the analysis below is recognizing three key issues: first, Islam is not
only a religion; it is an all-encompassing way of life.178 This makes it
difficult to question certain principles,179 unless the Qur’an and/or the
Sunnah (general behavior of the Prophet) offer a clear account.180
Second, for the Islamist the “gate of ijtihad” (reasoning) was closed
in the ninth century, which means that opponents of women’s rights
claim that new interpretations of Islamic law are not allowed.181
Simply, the argument is that this is what was decreed and Muslims
are bound by what had been decreed.182 Third, Muslim societies are
conservative,183 though, the sense of a conservatism intensifies in
relation to the family and to honor, which has a direct impact on the
public-private divide as those opposing the empowerment of women
increasing take the Islamist interpretation when it comes to family
and honor in rejecting reforms.184
The jurisdictional methodology of Islamic law, which originates
with the divine and moves to the earthly, reflects this broad view of
development of women’s rights in Muslim societies); Kathryn J. Webber, The Economic
Future of Afghan Women: The Interaction between Islamic Law and Muslim Culture, 18 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1049, 1052 (1997) (highlighting that Islam itself is not antiwoman;
rather, the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam, which is infused with misogynistic social
norms and customs, limits Afghan women’s economic opportunities).
176. Bharathi Venkatraman, for example, argues that the Report of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which criticizes arranged marriages,
common in Islamic States, highlights a cultural bias. Venkatraman, supra note 35, at
2000–02 (1995).
177. Id.
178. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ISLAM 3, 16–17,
158–59 (2d ed. 1990).
179. M. M. Slaughter writes: “[N]o distinction was made between religious law and
that of the secular state . . . . Law, consequently, is God-given and is constitutive of Islam
and of the Islamic community.” M. M. Slaughter, The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy,
Honor, and Freedom of Speech, 79 VA. L. REV. 153, 165 (1993).
180. See Abdullahi An-Na’im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the
Muslim Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491, 491–93 (1987) (discussing the relationship be-
tween Islamic law, international law and women’s rights); see also WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 21 (2009).
181. Hallaq, supra note 39, at 3–4 (rejecting the notion that the gates of Ijtihad were
closed and arguing that Islamic legal theory has continued to apply reasoning in inter-
preting Islamic law).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., ERNEST GELLNER, MUSLIM SOCIETY 1–2 (1991).
184. For example, Egypt’s four reservations to the CEDAW all involved family issues.
Anna Jenefsky, Permissibility of Egypt’s Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 15 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 199 (1991).
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Islam and the corresponding demands of its disciplines.185 At the top
of Islamic law is the Qur’an, which is comprised of the verbatim words
of Allah (God) as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed over a period
of twenty-three years and is therefore the most authoritative guide
to how Muslims should conduct themselves.186 Thus, the centrality of
the Qur’an stems from the fact that ‘huda’ (guiding light) provides its
reader with knowledge to help the reader live a righteous existence.187
The Qur’an’s centrality within the Muslim community can be ascribed
to this provision of knowledge—both divine and earthly.188 The thread
that links Muslims together, the Qur’an “is aimed at establishing
basic standards for Muslim societies and guiding these communities
in terms of their rights and responsibilities.”189 The challenge how-
ever is that within the Qur’an’s 114 surahs (chapters)190 and 6237
ayat (verses), only approximately 190 ayat are legal rules.191 The
limited number of legal rules has led to the development of second-
ary Islamic sources: the Sunnah, which comprises of the narratives
and practices sanctioned by the Prophet Mohammed in a series of
hadiths (reports); ijma (consensus of opinion), which is based on ra-
tional proof and reasoning that come from divine revelation; the qiyas,
which use analogical reasoning to cover the application of sharia to
new situations and ideas; and urf (custom),192 the collective practice of
a group of people, which complements rules that the Qur’an does not
fully explain.193 Consequently, a practicing Muslim has to combine the
185. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 35, at 312–18.
186. Id.
187. Muin-ud-din Ahmad Khan, The Concept of Knowledge in the Quran, 18 HUMAN-
OMICS 26, 26–27 (2002).
188. See, e.g., Ashraf U. Kazi & Abdel K. Halabi, The Influence of Quran and Islamic
Financial Transactions and Banking, 20 ARAB L.Q. 321, 322 (2006) (highlighting the role
of the Quran in guiding day-to-day life, including financial transactions and banking).
189. Javaid Rehman, The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human
Rights Law: Examining The Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq, 21 INT’L J. L.
POL’Y & FAM. 108, 108, 110 (2007) (assessing the compatibility of international human
rights law and Islamic family law, while highlighting the impact of socio-economic, political
and indigenous tribal values on the development of Islamic law).
190. ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN vii–viii (11th ed. 2006).
191. Gamal Moursi Badr writes that “[t]he Qur’an is far from being a legal code. In fact
it contains very few legal provisions. Out of a total of 6237 verses only 190 verses or [three
percent] of the total can be said to contain legal provisions.” Gamal Moursi Badr, Islamic
Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 187, 188 (1977–1978).
192. Modern Muslim society continues to rely on urf. See Wing, supra note 166, at 152–
53 (explaining that modern Muslim society continues to rely on urf).
193. Helena Malikyar notes that “[w]hen the great jurists such as Abu Hanifa and Malik
ibn Anas attempted to fill the gaps in Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence), they incorporated a
great deal of customary practices and traditionally established norms of their environment.
The Hanafi rulings on marriage and divorce . . . reflect their founder’s strictly patriarchal
heritage.” Helena Malikyar, Development of Family Law in Afghanistan: The Roles of the
Hanafi Madhab, Customary Practices and Power Politics, 16 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 389, 390
(1997). The Qur’an, for example, requires that a husband provide for his wife, without
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divine with the earthly.194 While duties (farud) are discernible within
the Qur’an, rights (huquq) are less visible.195 Islam’s strong emphasis
on communitarian values196 adds further complexity. Famed jurist
Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, for example, cautioned against tribal-
ism because it rejects the uniform application of Islam.197 The addi-
tional element of reasoning is controversial because the nature of the
Qur’an and its limited number of legal rules make it difficult at times
to reach a collective agreement (ijtihad jama’i).198 Few statements
within the Qur’an are unambiguous, such that legal pluralism—
which highlights the flexibility and adaptability of Islamic law when
the application of reasoning necessitates developments—plays an im-
portant role in its interpretation.199 Jurists al-Amidi and al-Baydawi,
however, take the position that only Muslim adults who are well-
versed in all aspects of Islamic law can engage in ijtihad.200 These
three elements are also affected by Muslim society’s loyalty to a sys-
tem of social hierarchy in which free, adult Muslim men enjoy the
most civil and political rights.201 Free mature Muslim women occupy
the second tier, with slave non-Muslim female minors occupying the
lowest tier.202 The rights of women draw on the first four sources:
the Qur’an, hadiths, ijma, and qiyas.203 Male dominance, however,
ensures that urf reasoning, disguised as true source of Islamic law,
takes precedence, therefore limiting the body of women’s rights.204
stating how much. Christie S. Warren, Lifting the Veil: Women and Islamic Law, 15
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 33, 38 (2008).
194. Warren, supra note 193, at 34.
195. Arzt, supra note 163, at 206.
196. Slaughter notes:
Islamic society thus is defined by a system of duties and obligations that God
commands man to follow. This will create a just society; in Islam this means
one that conforms to the will of God. Islam is therefore an intensely legal
religion where the law expresses the nomos and essence of the community.
This community, or ummah, replaces other boundaries of corporate identity
such as family, tribe, and nation. The ummah is open to all who recognize
Allah and his Prophet Mohammed. Neither membership nor allegiance is
determined by race, caste, or class.
Slaughter, supra note 179, at 173.
197. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Islamic Solidarity, in ISLAM IN TRANSITION:
MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES 16–18 (John J. Donohue & John L. Esposito eds., 2007).
198. Hallaq, supra note 39, at 7–8.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Nadirsyah Hosen, Nahdlatul Ulama and Collective Ijtihad, 6 NEW ZEALAND J.
ASIAN STUD. 5, 5 (2004).
201. Shaheen Sardar Ali asserts that of 6666 verses in the Qur’an at the most only six
verses reinforce the social hierarchy claim. SARDAR ALI, supra note 31, at 43.
202. Khaliq, supra note 143, at 13–14.
203. SARDAR ALI, supra note 31, at 42.
204. Writing about Palestinian women, Professor Wing states: “As a result of customary
norms, women are governed by a system of patriarchy in which their roles are limited to
nurturers and repositories of family honor.” Wing, supra note 166, at 152–53. See also John
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A. Islamism: Its Role and Impact on Women’s Rights
Islam has had to contend with many strands that espouse in-
terpretations and agendas manifestly different from those of the
mainstream.205 Since 9/11, conservative interpretations of Islam have
become more frequently associated with fundamentalists, radicals
and, in extreme cases, jihadists.206 The interconnectedness of poli-
tics, Islam and Islamic religious revivalism has facilitated the rise
of Islamism.207 Often viewed as a political movement, Islamism ap-
pears in different shades and variations.208 Islamists are interested
in not only ensuring that Muslims practice Islam in the same manner
as the Prophet Mohammed and his immediate followers, but also that
Islam is at the center of society: state.209 This demands participation
in the political process as a key way to change policy or introduce new
Hursh, Advancing Women’s Rights Through Islamic Law: The Example of Morocco, 27
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST., 252, 252, 275 (2012) (reviewing women’s rights in Morocco
following the 2004 changes to Morocco’s Code of Personal Status); Alexandra J. Zolan,
The Effect of Islamization on the Legal and Social Status of Women in Iran, 7 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 183, 193 (1987) (noting how the status of women changed after the Iranian
revolution due to the implementation of traditional Islamic precepts related to women,
their position and duties vis-à-vis the family).
205. MOHAMMED AYOOB, THE MANY FACES OF POLITICAL ISLAM: RELIGION AND POLITICS
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 22, 34 (2008).
206. Id. at 1, 17.
207. See OLIVER ROY, THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 4, 13 (Carol Volk trans., 1994);
Guilain Denoeux, The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam, 9 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 56,
61 (2002); Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 48, 49 (2002).
208. Mohammed Ayoob writes:
In practice, no two Islamisms are alike because they are determined by the
contexts within which they operate. What works in Egypt will not work in
Indonesia. What works in Saudi Arabia will not work in Turkey. Anyone
familiar with the diversity of the Muslim world—its socioeconomic characteris-
tics, cultures, political systems, and trajectories of intellectual development—
is bound to realize that the political manifestations of Islam, like the practice
of Islam itself, are to a great extent context specific, the result of the inter-
penetration of religious precepts and local culture, including political culture.
Mohammed Ayoob, Political Islam: Image and Reality, 21 WORLD POL’Y J. 1, 1–2 (2004);
Fuller, supra note 207, at 49–50.
209. Professor Maha Azzam notes:
The roots of contemporary radicalism lie more in the secular tradition and
experience than in the realms of religion and its legacy, which now offer so
many new trajectories in regard to legitimate political action and the resort
to violence. There is a shared anger and sense of humiliation across different
ideological and political groups in the Muslim world. Islamism has harnessed
these feelings and provided more effective networks and a more expressive
language of resistance than other ideological currents at this historical junc-
ture. Islamist groups continue to gain ground, partly because of an increase
in religiosity and faith in Muslim societies and partly because of politics.
With the growing Islamization of Muslim societies culturally, the ground is
being prepared for a greater acceptance among many for an Islamization of
the state as well.
Maha Azzam, Islamism Revisited, 82 INT’L AFF. 1119, 1121 (2006).
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measures through the political process.210 As Islamic law was incor-
porated into criminal and civil justice systems,211 the Muslim state
took over the legal realm by funding the Islamic court system.212 The
state thus became purveyor, interpreter and executor of the law, ef-
fectuating a synergy of religion and customary tribal norms.213 As
Wael B. Hallaq notes, this shift was possible because God revealed
textual signs “that form the speculative, hermeneutical basis of legal
construction.” 214 As the state became more established as a political
entity, it absorbed the responsibility for legal authority at the expense
of the faqihs (traditional legal scholars).215 The meaning of this change
becomes especially visible in circumstances in which the state is weak
and rulers are able to impose their will on the people either through
oppression or though social, economic or cultural incentives; as rulers
that view themselves as the embodiment of the state, seek support
from either cultural leaders or, more commonly, religious leaders, they
established a unique alliance that necessitates mutual support.216
In Islamist societies, debates over private and a public are not
particularly visible.217 Islamic law has incorporated cultural and
210. Stacey Philbrick Yadav writes:
Islamists can be understood as actors who seek to transform the terms of
public debate, whether institutionally or discursively. In the institutional
realm, this means changing the formal rules that order the relationship be-
tween state and society, while discursive change is reflected in the informal
rules and norms that give shape to this relationship.
Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Understanding “What Islamists Want:” Public Debate and Contes-
tation in Lebanon and Yemen, 64 MIDDLE E. J. 199, 200 (2010).
211. Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J.
INT’L L. 759, 760–61 (2004) (discussing how Islamic law and institutions must co-exist with
democratic governance).
212. Amira Sonbol writes:
One of the main reasons for the change in treatment of women in modern
Shari’ah courts is that when modern States built new separate Shari’ah
courts, they did not apply precedents from pre-modern Shari’ah courts.
Rather, modern States constructed legal codes compiled by committees,
handed the new codes to qadis educated in newly opened qadi schools, and
had them apply the codes in court.
Amira Sonbol, Women in Shari’ah Courts: A Historical and Methodological Discussion,
27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 225, 232–33 (2003).
213. Id.
214. Wael B. Hallaq, Juristic Authority vs. State Power: The Legal Crisis of Modern
Islam, 19 J.L & RELIGION 243, 245 (2003).
215. Id. at 258.
216. The most visible example of this type of relationship is Saudi Arabia where reli-
gion serves as a source of legitimacy for the ibn Saud royal family who in return only sup-
port the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam. See Michael G. Nehme, Saudi Arabia 1950–80:
Between Nationalism and Religion, 30 MIDDLE E. STUD. 930, 934 (1994); Joseph Nevo,
Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia, 34 Middle E. Stud. 34, 34, 37 (1998).
217. Elizabeth Thompson, Public and Private in Middle Eastern Women’s History, 15 J.
WOMEN’S HIST. 52, 52 (2003) (calling for greater discussion of the “public” and “private”
in examinations of the history of women’s issues in Muslim societies).
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traditional legal norms disguised as religious law with respect to
women and their rights.218 Male domination renders the public-
private dichotomy difficult to discern: men define the bounds of pri-
vate and public,219 and, male dominance within judicial and political
systems, coupled with a willingness to apply the repugnancy clause220
when interpreting laws, ensures a propensity to rule against women
and women’s rights that challenge patriarchy.221
B. Family Law and Women
When it comes to Muslim women, the gender debate occurs in
two increasingly interconnected spheres: (1) the religious sphere
that relies on the Qur’an and specifically Islamic law;222 and (2) the
cultural-socio-economic sphere223 that posits arguments designed to
either defend or reject the current status of Muslim women.224 Thus,
those opposing the empowerment of women may argue that em-
powerment would undermine social values, specifically the family.225
An integral element in the debate is the rewriting or reinterpre-
tation of history and religion.226 The role of culture and religion is
218. Id. at 54–55.
219. In Afghanistan and other countries in which the Constitution declares the country
is an Islamic Republic (Art. 1) and no law can challenge Islamic law (Art. 3), the division
between the private and public is non-existent. Islamic law is supreme. CONSTITUTION,
supra note 42, at Ch. 1, art. 1, 3. In the United Kingdom, for example, Islamic courts have
the authority to rule on Muslim civil cases, specifically, but not exclusively, cases relating
to family law, including domestic violence among married couples, and financial disputes.
Shari’a courts operate as arbitration tribunals. Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official
Sharia Courts, SUNDAY TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at 2.
220. “Repugnancy clauses” are “constitutional provisions that, in language that varies
from nation to nation, require legislation to conform to some core conception of Islam.”
Haider Ala Hamoudi, Repugnancy in the Arab World, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 427, 427
(2012).
221. See Amy C. Alexander & Christian Welzel, Islam and Patriarchy: How Robust is
Muslim Support for Patriarchal Values?, 21 INT’L REV. OF SOC. 249, 271 (2011) (finding
that Muslim support for patriarchy is strong).
222. See, e.g., An-Na’im, supra note 180, at 492.
223. BEVERLEY MILTON-EDWARDS, CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 174
(2000); see also Webber, supra note 175, at 1052 (noting that Islamic law grants women
specific economic rights, while recognizing that social and cultural norms limit women’s
economic power).
224. MILTON-EDWARDS, supra note 223, at 174–75.
225. Opponents of female empowerment who take a cultural approach argue that em-
powerment came at a social cost as it challenges traditional norms in relation to mascu-
linity. Margrethe Silberschmidt, Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East
Africa: Implications for Male Identity and Sexual Behavior, 29 WOR. DEV. 657, 658 (2001)
(discussing a case study finding that after economic hardship, women’s empowerment
is inversely related to male self-esteem and arguing that patriarchy helps disguise male
growing sense of disempowerment).
226. A good example of this is the debate over polygamy. Before the Battle of Uhud,
polygamy was associated with jahiliyya—pre-Islamic times. After the battle, however,
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well-established,227 but it becomes most visible with respect to
sexuality228 and family law, specifically divorce229 and children and
women’s obedience to their husband or male relatives.230 Iranian femi-
nist Ziba Mir-Hosseini captured this development, arguing that the
most developed area of fiqh (science of jurisprudence) is Islamic family
law.231 This is ironic because family law is also the area in which “the
boundary between sacred and temporal has been most blurred.” 232
Thus, jurisprudence is central to women’s rights and the position of
women in Islam; it is through fiqh that Muslim jurists interpret the
shari’a, which is then applied to society as a whole.233 Notably, when
delving into the discourse, there exists a need to distinguish between
the Prophet Mohammed allegedly allowed Muslim men to take multiple wives because
only ten percent of the men who went to battle with Mohammed survived, leaving many
women and children without a husband/father to support them. Brooke D. Rodgers-Miller,
Note, Out of Jahiliyya: Historic and Modern Incarnations of Polygamy in the Islamic
World, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 541, 543–45 (2005).
227. See, e.g., Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s
Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (1997) (“Many aspects of the life of Muslims in
Muslim countries, including their views on the education of women and their family laws,
rest in substantial part on medieval Islamic jurisprudence. Scholars based this jurispru-
dence on two components: religious and cultural.”).
228. Justin Leites, Modernist Jurisprudence as a Vehicle for Gender Role Reform in
the Islamic World, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251, 255–60 (1991).
229. Arguably, only men have the right to seek a divorce. Karin Carmit Yefet, The
Constitution and Female-Initiated Divorce in Pakistan: Western Liberalism in Islamic
Garb, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 553, 557 (2011).
230. Conservative Muslims refer to Sura 4, Verse 34 in the Qur’an to justify men’s domi-
nance within the family. The verse states:
(Husbands) are the protectors And maintainers of their (wives) Because Allah
has given The one more (strength) Than the other, and because They sup-
port them From their means. Therefore the righteous women Are devoutly
obedient, and guard In (the husband’s) absence What Allah would have them
guard. As to those women On whose part ye fear Disloyalty and ill-conduct,
Admonish them (first), (Next) refuse to share their beds, (And last) spank
them (lightly); But if they return to obedience, Seek not against them means
(of annoyance): For Allah is Most High Great (above you all).
YUSUF ALI, supra note 190, at 195–96; see also Hajjar, supra note 36, at 10 (looking at the
relationship among domestic violence, impunity and the state, and how religion is used
to block legislation that would prevent domestic violence).
231. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 45, at 643.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Asma T. Uddin, Religious Freedom Implications of Sharia Implementation
in Aceh, Indonesia, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 603, 603 (2010) (analyzing regulations and their
impact on society in Aceh). Shannon Dunn and Rosemary Kellison note a German case in
which a woman of Moroccan descent petitioned a German court for a speedy divorce on the
grounds that her husband was physically abusive towards her and had threatened to kill
her. Even though the police had come to the couple’s home, Judge Christa Datz-Winter
refused the petition, arguing that wife beating was common in Moroccan culture and the
Qur’an permits such violence. Shannon Dunn & Rosemary B. Kellison, At the Intersection
of Scripture and Law: Qur’an 4:34 and Violence against Women, 26 J. FEMINIST STUD.
& RELIGION 11, 11–12 (2010).
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the religion that is Islam and those that interpret it.234 As Amina
Wadud notes: “[A]fter the death of the Prophet, Islam, as it has been
practiced, has been less than just to women.” 235 She adds:
[S]ocial groups—have not always lived up to complete gender
justice. The absence of justice and equality for women in Muslim
society was not the intention of Islam as established in the
Qur’anic worldview, nor was it an intention of Muslim societies
to dishonor women. However, when such injustice has been made
apparent, we must alleviate its impact and correct its harm,
rather than defend it on the grounds that it was unintentional.236
Islam guaranteed Muslim women an independent legal personal-
ity that includes a right to hold property, have their own inheritance,
enjoy education—as long as it is separated from that of men—and
participate in public life.237 Also, when it comes to family law, Islam
not only restricted polygamy, but guaranteed a wife’s right to main-
tenance and right treatment.238 This view is based on the claim that
Islam does not distinguish between men and women when it comes
to their relationship with Allah.239 These scholars thus maintain that
a distinction exists between Islamic law and its interpretation.240
Islamists however reject the aforementioned view, taking a distinctive
view of women and their rights, which stems from the way they inter-
pret the Qur’an, Islamic Law,241 and fiqh, which they use to justify
234. Ziba Mir-Hosseini argues that the loss of stature and rights of women in Iran can
be attributed to the rising importance that clerics placed on fiqh, especially in the realm
of family law. She claims:
The Islamic judges in whose courts I sat in the 1980s often told me that I had
chosen the wrong place to learn about the sharia. I should to [sic] go to the
seminaries, they said, to read fiqh texts and discuss them with the ulama;
the courts had nothing to teach me about the sharia.
Mir-Hosseini, supra note 45, at 635.
235. Amina Wadud, Towards a Qur’anic Hermeneutics of Social Justice: Race, Class
and Gender, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 37, 47 (1996).
236. Id.
237. See Webber, supra note 175, at 1060–62, 1068, 1070; see also Sayeh & Morse, supra
note 35, at 324–25 (1995).
238. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 35, at 328–29.
239. Khaliq, supra note 143, at 12–13; Sadia Kausar, Sjaad Hussain & Mohammad
Mazher Idriss, Does the Qur’an Condone Domestic Violence?, in HONOUR, VIOLENCE,
WOMEN AND ISLAM 96, 96 (Mohammad Mazher Idriss & Tahir Abbas eds., 2010).
240. See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS xi (4th ed. 1995) (explaining
that Islam is only one factor in contemporary human rights in Muslim society); Webber,
supra note 175, at 1052–53, 1057–58 (illustrating the difference between Islam and social
norms in economic laws).
241. See J. Malcolm Garcia, Why Syria’s Islamists are Gaining, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
Feb. 16–17, 2013, at 8; Camilla Hall & Michael Peel, Women Anxious After Islamist Elec-
tion Victory, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2012, at 3; Patrick Kingsley, International: Islamists
Critical of UN Move on Women’s Rights, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 16, 2013, at 31; Trudy
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their discriminatory agenda.242 The clearest manifestation of the
Islamist agenda vis-à-vis women is its defense of polygamy243 based
on Surah 4:3, which reads: “Marry women of your choice, [t]wo, or
three, or four.” 244 The Islamists also apply other surahs, such as
surah 24:31 to support the segregation of women and as a defense
for the veil.245 Polygamy, segregation of the sexes and the veil are
common in traditional, rural Muslim societies that sustain their cul-
tural and tribal heritage.246 As a result, the link between culture and
religion is at times blurred in traditional Muslim society.247
C. Family, Tribal Practices, Patriarchy and Insecurity
The masculine interpretation of Islam becomes most visible in
societies with a strong tribal identity—Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq,
Rubin, Worldview: Women Apprehensive Over Rise of Islamist Parties, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Oct. 30, 2011, at D01.
242. See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 35, at 312.
243. Heather Johnson, Note, There Are Worse Things than Being Alone: Polygamy in
Islam, Past, Present, and Future, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563, 563, 565–69 (2005)
(reviewing the debate over polygamy in Islam and noting the different interpretation of
Surah 4:3).
244. ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN 184 (1997). The problem
with this Surah is that when it is read in its fullest, a different image emerges.
If ye fear that ye shall not [b]e able to deal justly [w]ith the orphans, [m]arry
women of your choice, [t]wo, or three, or four; [b]ut if ye fear that ye shall
not [b]e able to deal justly (with them), [t]hen only one, or (a captive) [t]hat
your right hands possess. That will be more suitable, [t]o prevent you [f]rom
doing injustice.
Id. When the Prophet Mohammed’s wife Khadija died, this Surah arguably permitted his
marriage to a number of women as a way to strengthen Islam and gain protection from
enemies that wanted to harm him and Islam. Leila Ahmed, Women and the Advent of
Islam, 11 SIGNS 665, 678–88 (1985) (recognizing the difficulty of discerning to the impact
of Islam on women).
245. See, e.g., Valorie K. Vojdik, Politics of the Headscarf in Turkey: Masculinities,
Feminism, and the Construction of Collective Identities, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 661,
666–76 (2010) (arguing that the debate over the veil in Turkey is as much about power as
it is about religion, secularism and the relationship between the West and Islam); see also
Mayer, supra note 22, at 402–04 (arguing that Islamism represents an interpretation of
Islamic law and that the construction of Islamic precepts vis-à-vis women in Saudi Arabia
and Iran stems from that distinctive interpretation).
246. See, e.g., Sarah Carmichael, Marriage and Power: Age at First Marriage and
Spousal Age Gap in Lesser Developed Countries, 16 THE HISTORY OF THE FAMILY 416 (2011)
(finding that education and urbanization have an impact on the age at which one marries).
247. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights, 12
AM U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (1997).
The cultural component gave rise to certain fundamental social and political
assumptions. These assumptions have become so deeply-rooted in Islamic
jurisprudence that many Muslims are no longer aware of their non-religious
origins. The assumptions gave rise to a then common model of state and fam-
ily relationships which are best described today as authoritarian/patriarchal.
Id.
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Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan.248 In these tribal societies, the role
and the significance of the family increase.249 Economic progress and
social movement occur through the family,250 which also imposes
enormous restrictions on women who sustain the tribe through pro-
creation, thereby compelling men to control them.251 Albert Hourani
views the “tribe” as a natural phenomenon of rural society in which
people come together because cooperation is central for survival.252
Russel Barsh asserts that the term tribal in contemporary social sci-
ence denotes a group of related people that share a kinship that sets
them apart from others.253 “In a tribe, kinship is the principal institu-
tion; social, economic, cultural, religious and political activity is orga-
nized around kinship groupings, such as lineages and clans. Kinship
relationships govern most individual rights and responsibilities.” 254
In societies in which insecurity is pervasive and the state is either
non-existent or perpetually weak, individuals believe that they can
only rely on themselves for security. This explains the development
248. The influence of tribal culture on women is evident in Afghanistan in which familial
or kinship ties have extended into political and religious worlds. Dupree, supra note 28, at
986 (explaining that Afghans remain committed to their identity, which is based on tradi-
tion, location and culture, in spite of attempts to promote a national identity); see also
Vojdik, supra note 245, at 672–79 (using masculinities theory to examine the veil and its
relationship to gender, political power and the state).
249. Hamza A. Alavi, Kinship in West Punjab Villages, 6 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIAN
SOCIOLOGY 1, 1–3, 5 (1972).
250. In Pakistan, for example, the biraderi (brotherhood) of participation links families
together. Id. at 1–2. Daniyal Mueenuddin, a Punjabi mango farmer describes biraderi:
In Pakistan, your primary loyalty is to your biraderi, an untranslatable word,
something like clan, but more visceral and entailing greater responsibility and
connection. You marry among your biraderi, you must travel and be present
when a member of your biraderi is married or buried and, in times of trouble,
you stand by your biraderi.
Daniyal Mueenuddin, A Lifetime, Washed Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, at A27. In the
Arab World, the concept of wasta—mediation or intercession—allows one to intercede
to provide a benefit to a client or family member. Robert B. Cunningham & Yasmin K.
Sarayrah, Taming “Wasta”: to Achieve Development, 16 ARAB STUD. Q. 29, 29 (1994); Jihad
Makhoul & Lindsey Harrison, Intercessory Wasta and Village Development in Lebanon,
26 ARAB STUD. Q. 25, 31 (2004).
251. Sherifa Zuhur, Of Milk-Mothers and Sacred Bonds: Islam, Patriarchy, and New
Reproductive Technologies, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1725, 1726 (1991–1992) (highlighting
the importance of children, specifically sons: “Failure to bear sons often resulted in divorce
and a return to a woman’s parental home, or in her husband’s marriage to another wife
through the institution of polygamy. The pain of childlessness held devastating economic
and social meaning for Muslim women.”).
252. Albert Hourani, Conclusion: Tribes and States in Islamic History, in TRIBE & STATE
FORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 303–04 (Philip S. Khoury & Joseph Kostiner, eds.,
1990); see also TAMIM AL-BARGHOUTI, THE UMMA AND THE DAWLA: THE NATION STATE
AND THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 38–39 (2008).
253. Russel Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? Desirable?,
8 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 74, 75 (1999).
254. Id.
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of the tribe and its continued existence.255 Fawaz Gerges writes that
a tribalist society, “is disproportionately more religious than other
social configurations. Among members of a tribe, the good of the in-
dividual is subservient to the collective good. When overlapping with
religious and ideological affinities, tribal loyalties can be a powerful
motivator.” 256 Accordingly, the family is sacrosanct in tribal societies
because it not only holds the tribe together, but also enables the
tribe to withstand threats through filial linkages—all have to stand
together against any threat or insult.257 Religious values only serve
to place more demands on the family, which becomes central not
only to the survival of the tribe but to the umma (community of the
faithful).258 Islamists who espouse this rationale are therefore able
to argue that the primary role of women is to raise children and look
after the family,259 which in turn strengthens the community.260
Donna Lee Brown writes:
For conservative religious groups (including Muslim activists),
women’s behavior has become shorthand for the health of a
society. Moreover, women’s roles have become a mark of piety and
religiosity. Men’s religiosity is judged by the demeanor of their
women and the women’s conformity to ideal norms of behavior.
The well-being of the community hinges upon visible patterns of
female conduct.261
The final ingredient within tribal societies, the importance of
which is heightened by customary practices, is honor. Honor plays
255. See AL-BARGHOUTI, supra note 252, at 62–63, 93.
256. GERGES, supra note 37, at 108.
257. A contemporary example of this is the notion of “honor killing” a practice that in-
volves the participation of families, immediate or extended, pain killing a person deemed
to have brought shame and dishonor to the family and the tribe. See, e.g., Mazna Hussain,
“Take My Riches, Give Me Justice”: A Contextual Analysis of Pakistan’s Honor Crimes
Legislation, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 223, 223–24 (2006) (noting that Mukhtar Mai was
raped on the alleged order of Mastoi tribal council to punish Mai’s brother who was accused
of having sexual relations with a woman from the Mastoi tribe); see also Rachel A. Ruane,
Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan and Pakistan, 14 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2000).
258. NAZIH N. AYUBI, POLITICAL ISLAM: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE ARAB WORLD
35–36 (2003); Beth Baron, Women, Honour, and the State: Evidence from Egypt, 42 MIDDLE
E. STUD. 1, 1–3 (2006).
259. C. Christine Fair’s study of madrasas in Pakistan emphasizes the role that women
(mothers) play in fostering Islamic observance. At its most extreme, it encourages suicide
terrorism. See C. Christine Fair, Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?, 20
TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE 49, 61 (2008); C. Christine Fair, The Educated Militants
of Pakistan: Implications for Pakistan’s Domestic Security, 16 CONT. S. ASIA 93, 96 (2008);
C. Christine Fair, Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other
Organizations, 27 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 489, 495 (2004).
260. GERGES, supra note 37, at 52–54.
261. Donna Lee Bowen, Islamic Law and the Position of Women, in ISLAM AND SOCIAL
POLICY 44 (Stephen P. Heyneman, ed. 2004).
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a central role in the maintenance, preservation and expansion of dis-
criminatory practices.262 Studies suggest, in fact, that the issue of
honor is not associated with religion as much as it is linked to cultural
and tribal norms.263 The issue of honor became central to the forma-
tion of the Arab state; the state is considered a feminine entity and
defense obligations fall on men.264 When the state is dishonored by
a failure to adhere to strict Islamic or customary norms, men are also
dishonored because they are unable to protect the state.265 As Beth
Baron explains, “[h]onour in the Arab world is thus a collective af-
fair[;] . . . [it] helped define the parameters of the collective. The en-
tire family’s honour—and here family meant those related by blood
through the male line—resides in the conduct of its women.” 266
In contemporary Muslim society, “honor killings” exemplify the
centrality of honor to the family and a woman’s position in society.267
262. See ARE KNUDSEN, VIOLENCE AND BELONGING: LAND, LOVE AND LETHAL CONFLICT
IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE OF PAKISTAN 129–30 (2009) (presenting an ethno-
graphic study of the people of NWFP that highlights the impact of honor on society and
its role in perpetuating often decade-long feuds). A study of 865 ninth-grade students in
Jordan revealed that about approximately 40 percent of boys and around 20 percent of girls
subscribe to the view that the killing of a daughter, sister or wife who has shamed or dis-
honored the family is justifiable. Manuel Eisner & Lana Ghuneim, Honor Killing Atti-
tudes Amongst Adolescents in Amman, Jordan, 39 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 405, 405, 415
(2013); see also Masood Ali Shaikh et al., Attitudes About Honour Killing Among Men and
Women—Perspective From Islamabad, 22 J. AYUB MED. C. ABOTTABAD 38, 39 (2010) (find-
ing that of the 600 individuals that participated in the study, 343 or 57.1 percent found it
acceptable and justifiable to kill one’s wife as a mean to save one’s honor).
263. Eisner and Ghuneim conclude: “[S]upport for honor killings is more widespread
amongst adolescents from poorer and more traditional family backgrounds.” Eisner &
Ghuneim, supra note 262, at 413. Moreover, they assert that traditionalism, a belief in
female chastity and a tendency to morally neutralize aggressive behaviors inform attitudes
towards honor killings. Id.
264. See Christina A. Madek, Note, Killing Dishonor: Effective Eradication of Honor
Killing, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 53, 55 (2006) (arguing that honor killings have
become more entrenched and prominent in Islamic culture even though the Qur’an neither
condones nor promotes the practice); Ruane, supra note 257, at 1567–68 (examining how
the issue of women’s right is addressed in Jordan and Pakistan and why international law
fails to provide solutions).
265. See Beth Baron, The Construction of National Honor in Egypt, 5 GENDER & HIST.
244, 250 (1993).
266. Beth Baron, Women, Honour, and the State: Evidence from Egypt, 42 MIDDLE E.
STUD. 1, 1 (2006).
267. Lindsey N. Devers and Sarah Bacon write:
Honor crimes are a fatal form of social control and are a result of a broader
form of gender threat. . . . At the individual level, women who violate these
norms are considered a threat the community simply by the fact that they are
antisocial or deviant to social mores and norms. At the macro level, because
there is a lack of punishment by the state, men receive lenient punishment be-
cause this type of crime is seen as a traditional, cultural and familial, rather
than an issue of law.
Lindsey N. Devers & Sarah Bacon, Interpreting Honor Crimes: The Institutional Disregard
Towards Female Victims of Family Violence in the Middle East, 3 INT’L J. CRIM. & SOC.
THEORY 359, 369 (2010).
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Ideas about the proper conduct of women mold the concept of honor
while the duty of restoring honor falls on men.268 A belief in male
ownership of women gives rise to the notion that one can and should
kill or harm a female family member if she behaves immorally or
immodestly.269 The high incidence of honor killings270 suggests that
men have responded to female immodesty in an increasingly extreme
manner—with the spilling of blood.271
IV. AFGHANISTAN AND WOMEN
Afghanistan has been in a state of persistent conflict since the
1970s. In 1973, Prince Daoud overthrew King Zahir Shah, ushering in
a period of instability272 that became worse after the Saur Revolution
of 1978.273 The 1979 Soviet invasion then led to a ten-year war.274
With the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan descended into further vio-
lence (akin to a civil war) as the different mujahedeen groups fought
for supremacy.275 This period facilitated the rise of the Taliban, which
in turn faced opposition from other factions such as the Northern
Alliance.276 Following 9/11, a U.S.-led international force invaded
268. Id. at 360–61.
269. Id.
270. Ali Shaikh et al., supra note 262, at 38 (finding that of the 600 individuals that par-
ticipated in the study, 343 or 57.1 percent found it acceptable and justifiable to kill one’s
wife as a means to save one’s honor).
271. In a piece on honor killing in Jordan, Douglas Jehl uses the case of Basma Goul,
whose husband accused her of being unfaithful. Jehl notes that the accusation resulted
in the ostracization of the Goul family; Basma’s eight sisters were deemed unmarriage-
able and her five brothers were taunted in the streets. Basma’s sixteen-year-old brother
ultimately killed her. Douglas Jehl, Murder for Honor, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Dec. 13, 1999,
at 18.
272. Prince Daoud adopted a very ambitious program of economic and social reform akin
to Stalin’s infamous five-year plans that included the nationalization of banks and insur-
ance as well as major reforms to agriculture, taxation, commercial and criminal law. NANCY
PEABODY NEWELL & RICHARD S. NEWELL, THE STRUGGLE FOR AFGHANISTAN 47 (1981);
David Chaffetz, Afghanistan in Turmoil, 56 INT’L AFF. 15, 16 (1980).
273. The Saur Revolution led to the emergence of the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA). Primarily a student movement in the 1960s, the PDPA benefitted
from the liberal policies of King Zahir Shah. It was supported by the Soviet Union and its
aims were Marxist in nature, as it advocated the transformation of Afghanistan into a
communist state. Alam Payind, Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation,
21 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 107, 113–14 (1989). The catalyst for Daoud’s overthrow was
the April 17, 1978 assassination of prominent Parcham activist Mir Akbar Khayber.
Khayber’s funeral drew thousands and the Daoud regime panicked, initiating a wave of
arrests of PDPA members. On April 27, members of the PDPA and the military stormed
Daoud’s palace, killing him and his family. William Maley, Afghanistan: An Historical and
Geographical Appraisal, 92 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 859, 863 (2010).
274. Id. at 865.
275. Id. at 869.
276. MARTIN EWANS, AFGHANISTAN: A SHORT HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE AND POLITICS 183
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Afghanistan, erecting a new political system and engaging in low-
intensity conflict against Taliban, Al Qaeda and other groups.277
Afghan women, like most women in conflict, have endured im-
measurable hardship and pain.278 Although conflict affects men and
women differently,279 conflict has only exacerbated the suffering of
Afghan women.280 Patriarchal cultural and religious practices also con-
tribute to the historically weak position of women in Afghan society.281
Thus, this section maintains that gender equality has failed to develop
in Afghanistan not because of Islam or Islamic law but because of
cultural practices that keep women in a state of servitude by prevent-
ing them from acquiring education or independent employment.282
Men have strengthened the binding nature of cultural norms—many
of which developed out of the continuous state of insecurity—by at-
taching a conservative interpretation of Islamic law to these cultural
norms.283 As cultural practices are transformed into Islamic norms, it
becomes more difficult to challenge these practices.284 Afghan culture,
(2001); AMIN SAIKAL, MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL
221 (2004).
277. SAIKAL, supra note 276, at 229.
278. See Telesetsky, supra note 168, at 296 (recounting the limitations imposed on
women under the Taliban); Sima Wali et al., The Impact of Political Conflict on Women:
The Case of Afghanistan, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 1474, 1475 (1999) (highlighting the
negative impact of conflict on the mental health of Afghan women).
279. During the campaign against the Soviet Union, women who had to escape to refugee
camps in Pakistan and Iran often lost their homes and husbands to the fighting. When the
war ended, Afghanistan descended into a state of civil conflict during which criminals fre-
quently preyed on women. When the Taliban emerged, women were driven from the public
space and were prevented from working or engaging in other activities that the Taliban
deemed un-Islamic. See Wali, supra note 278, at 1475–76.
280. In a study on cultural values in Afghanistan, Nancy Dupree notes that the Soviet
invasion placed greater emphasis on cultural values:
Torn from their protected home environments, the mostly rural refugees
settled in kin-related groups for whom the preservation of cultural values
was paramount. Upholding family honour and maintaining a good reputa-
tion in the eyes of the foreigners surrounding them was essential. Sadly, to
many among the mujahideen (freedom fighters) who exercised power over
these refugee populations, presenting the proper image meant imposing the
strictest rules of physical and psychological seclusion on women, causing
considerable strain.
Dupree, supra note 28, at 984.
281. For example, Pashtunwali (Code of the Pathan), an informal justice system resolves
conflicts between families by “giving” daughters. See Moghadam, supra note 16, at 144.
282. For an interesting, albeit somewhat controversial insight into the position of women
in post-Taliban Afghanistan, see ASNE SEIERSTAD, THE BOOKSELLER OF KABUL ix (Ingrid
Christophersen trans. 2004).
283. See Moghadam, supra note 16, at 147.
284. Mark Drumbl writes: “In Afghanistan, local justice involves a fusion of Islamic and
customary law that responds to and reflects endemic cultures of war.” Mark A. Drumbl,
Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women of Afghanistan, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 349, 352 (2004).
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which positions women as guardians of the family’s honor and pro-
tectors of cultural heritage, also contributes to gender inequality.285
The burden on Afghan women is greater, in part, because a woman’s
honor is conflated with familial honor.286 Geographical divides be-
tween the center (Kabul and the other major cities) and the periphery
(rural society) also intensify misunderstandings about Afghanistan
and Afghan women.287 As Huma Ahmed-Ghosh notes:
Rural Afghanistan is the root of tribal powers that have fre-
quently doomed Kabul-based modernization efforts. Social tradi-
tionalism and economic underdevelopment of rural Afghanistan
have repeatedly contested the center (Kabul), thus a better under-
standing of tribal controlled areas is essential to empower women
in these regions. For women in rural Afghanistan, control over
their lives and gender roles is determined by patriarchal kinship
arrangements. These kinship relationships are derived from the
Quran and tribal traditions where men exercise unmitigated power
over women. While Islam is deeply entrenched in the country, a
hybridized compromise of Islamic and secular ideals of gender
relations, along with economic reconstruction of rural Afghanistan
will be proposed as a process towards enhancing women’s status.288
Competing views and narratives populate writing on Afghanistan;
while some focus on the progress that has taken place since the Tali-
ban period, others highlight the limited nature of development.289
Contemporary Afghanistan is also characterized by fluidity such that
great variance exists among provinces and within provinces during
different seasons.290 Writing about women in Afghanistan is further
complicated by differences between theory and reality291 making it
285. This was most evident in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Saba Gul Khattak,
In/Security: Afghan Women Refugees, in WOMEN, SECURITY, SOUTH ASIA: A CLEARING IN
THE THICKETS 112–33, 124 (Farah Faizal & Swarna Rajagopalan eds., 2005).
286. Ahmed-Ghosh, Lessons, supra note 75, at 2–3.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1.
289. Discussions about the education sector typify the two approaches. Although there
has been a proliferation of education facilities and substantive growth in enrollment, the
provision of education remains uneven and poor. See, e.g., Antonio Giustozzi & Claudio
Franco, The Battle for the Schools: The Taleban and State Education, AFGHANISTAN
ANALYSTS NETWORK, 11 (2011), available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/2011
TalebanEducation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LX6P-W8KN.
290. For example, there are less insurgent attacks during winter months due to in-
clement weather. C. J. Chivers, A Long, Hot Summer—A New Fighting Season Has Begun
for U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 23, 2010, at A4.
291. Carolyn Kissane, The Way Forward for Girls’ Education in Afghanistan, 13 J. INT’L
WOMEN STUD. 10, 14 (2012) (maintaining that “there is a gap between the de jure right to
education and the de facto ability to access it.”).
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difficult at times to distinguish between fact and fiction.292 And, as
Huma Ahmed-Ghosh argues, Afghan women’s approach to human
rights differs from that of their western counterparts in that it fo-
cuses more on religion and social norms as opposed to demanding and
gaining specific rights: “it is clear they want to reconnect and reunite
with their families, lead good Muslim lives, and find work to support
their families.” 293
When focusing on the public-private divide when promoting
norms of gender equality, claims concerning foreign intervention and
influence emerge.294 Opponents of gender equality portray it as a
western concept,295 a program designed to penetrate the private realm
of Afghan society.296 Many Afghan men accept women serving in par-
liament or holding other public positions.297 Yet, they continue to
292. See, e.g., James Khalil, Neither Fact nor Fiction: The Validity of Opinion Polling
in Afghanistan, SMALL WARS J. (Dec. 26, 2011), available at http://smallwarsjournal.com
/jrnl/art/neither-fact-nor-fiction-the-validity-of-opinion-polling-in-afghanistan, archived at
http://perma.cc/BEG8-MWFZ. In a speech before the UN Commission on the Status of
Women, Hussn Banu Ghazanfar, Minister of Women’s Affairs, pointed to nine key achieve-
ments in post-Taliban Afghanistan, which include (among others): increasing the number
of companies managed by women to over 700; a 25 percent increase in the number of
women within the Afghan government; a 31 percent increase in the number of female
teachers; and the establishment of Prosecution Offices on the Elimination of Violence
against Women in ten provinces. Hussn Banu Ghazanfar, Minister of Women’s Affairs,
Statement at Fifty-Seventh Session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women,
New York (Mar. 2013), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/generaldiscussion
/memberstates/afghanistan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/57HP-DYE8.
293. Ahmed-Ghosh, Voices, supra note 11, at 31.
294. See Choudhury, supra note 72, at 166; see also Leela Jacinto, Abandoning the
Wardrobe and Reclaiming Religion in the Discourse on Afghan Women’s Islamic Rights,
32 SIGNS 9, 13 (2006).
295. See Ali M. Latif, Afghan Women in Fight Over Rights Law, AL-JAZEERA (May 30,
2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/201352711108360922.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/WC9S-T3N8; see also Borhan Osman, The EVAW Law—
An Evil Law? The Backlash at Kabul University, AFGHANISTAN ANALYSTS NETWORK
(May 26, 2013), http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-evaw-law-an-evil-law-the-back
lash-at-kabul-university, archived at http://perma.cc/A2AQ-XLQY.
296. The Afghan-born writer Nushin Arbabzadah captures the critiques of men con-
cerning the western world’s approach to women’s rights:
Afghan families were far from perfect but they had the advantage of resting
on centuries of tradition rather than relying on whimsical policies formu-
lated in the distant cities of London, New York and Washington. Weighing
up the pros and cons of individual liberation in a traditional society versus
the merits of sticking to tried and tested traditions, most women opted for
the latter.
Nushin Arbabzadah, Afghan Women Remain Wary of Politics—and Rightly So, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/09/afghan
-women-politics-taliban-afghanistan, archived at http://perma.cc/NW3X-URNR.
297. See Susan Sachs, In Broken Justice System, Women in Kabul Find Their Legal
Voice, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 21, 2011, at A8; Heidi Vogt, Enlisting Afghan Men to
Empower Women, THE ADVERTISER , Apr. 18, 2009, at 64.
2014] FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND AFGHANISTAN 129
resist changes within the private sphere.298 Furthermore, concerns
with communal reputation blur the private-public divide in ways that
contribute to the persistence of gender inequality. For example, sup-
port for the education of girls may be undermined by cultural or tra-
ditional norms that lead parents to fear that sending their daughter
to school may result in communal castigation.299 Carolyn Kissane
points out that Afghan parents insist that only women teach their
daughters; the scarce number of female teachers often hinders girls’
access to education.300 Similar issues surface with domestic abuse.301
In spite of calls to end such practices, others argue that it is an in-
trusion into the private realm and, therefore, outside the bounds of
public discussions.302
Ending discrimination and empowering women in Afghanistan
is highly complex because it influences every facet of Afghan culture
and history.303 Ideological differences across geographic space also
pose challenges to addressing gender inequality.304 In sum, despite
over a decade of international intervention in Afghanistan, many
ordinary women remain second-class citizens, receiving no support
or assistance from the state, while the international community, al-
though speaking in favor of women’s empowerment, fails to act when
evidence of mistreatment and abuse emerges.
298. Arbabzadah, supra note 296, at 2.
299. Isobel Coleman, Beyond the Burqa: The Future of Afghan Women’s Rights, 5 GEO.
J. INT’L AFF. 57, 59–60 (2004).
300. Carolyn Kissane, The Way Forward for Girls’ Education in Afghanistan, 13 J. INT’L
WOMEN STUD. 10, 16 (2012) (claiming “the fact that notions of democratic reforms are auto-
matically held suspect by many of those in positions of formal and informal power within
the country is both exacerbated by and exacerbates limited access of education for girls
and women”).
301. See, e.g., Emma Graham-Harrison, Sahar Gul Seared Afghanistan’s Conscience
but Her Tormentors are Free, THE GUARDIAN, July 11, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk
/world/2013/jul/11/sahar-gul-afghanistan-tormentors-free, archived at http://perma.cc
/MEJ7-SW7A.
302. See id.; see also Graham-Harrison, supra note 48.
303. For example, Meri Melissi Hartley-Blecic suggests that King Amanullah’s reformist
agenda and his wife’s behavior were instrumental in his overthrow. Meri Melissi Hartley-
Blecic, The Invisible Women: The Taliban’s Oppression of Women in Afghanistan, 7 ILSA
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 553, 556 (2001); see also Norman B. Hannah, Afghanistan: The Great
Gamble, 6 ASIAN AFF. 187, 189–93 (1979).
304. For example, in three districts in Nangarhar Province women are treated as famil-
ial possessions that may be traded. Shakila Abrahimkhil, Trading of Women Rife in East
Afghanistan, Report Claims, TOLONEWS (Mar. 30, 2013), available at http://www.tolonews
.com/en/afghanistan/9961-trading-of-women-rife-in-east-afghanistan-report-claims,
archived at http://perma.cc/49L5-J6PA; see also Vincent Icheku, Post-Taliban Measures
to Eliminate Gender Discrimination in Employment, 30 EQUAL., DIVERSITY & INCLUSION:
AN INT’L J. 563, 566 (2009) (noting “the distribution of the success [in terms of employment
of women] was not even within all Afghan provinces”).
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A. Afghan Women in the Post-9/11 Period
Women in post-2001 Afghanistan are undoubtedly in a much
better situation than they were under the Taliban, but it remains
unclear how long this will continue.305 Many avenues previously closed
have—in theory and in practice—opened up because the state no
longer demands that women remain hidden from public spaces. The
internationally led reconstruction program has focused on improving
the lives of ordinary Afghans and particularly of women306 who were
disproportionately impacted by decades of conflict and Taliban rule.307
Great emphasis has been placed on providing women with represen-
tation. The Afghan Constitution, for example, allocates seats to women
to ensure that women have the same rights as men and to facilitate
the adoption, promotion and enforcement of laws.308
Decades of discrimination rooted in religion, culture and tribal
practices have placed Afghan women in an almost impossible situa-
tion. Women must simultaneously challenge established cultural and
religious norms, overcome a lack of education and economic rights,
and grapple with pervasive insecurity arising from ongoing insur-
gency and criminal activity.309 Thirty years of conflict has created
305. See, e.g., Violent Crime Against Afghan Women Hits Record Levels, Says Rights
Chief, AL-JAZEERA AMERICA (Jan. 5, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1
/5/violent-crime-againstafghanwomenhitsrecordlevels.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/M5WA-UMX6 (highlighting the rise in violence against women).
306. In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush declared:
The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghani-
stan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to
school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan’s new government.
And we welcome the new minister of women’s affairs, Doctor Sima Samar.
President George W. Bush, The State of the Union Address (Jan. 30, 2002) (transcript
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/30/usa?INTCMP=SRCH, archived
at http://perma.cc/8JD6-79MT).
307. During the war against Soviet occupation, combatants in the civil war targeted
women who had to endure sexual violence, abuse, forced marriages and kidnapping. When
the Taliban rose to power in 1994, its various edicts prevented women from leaving the
home unaccompanied by a close male relative, prohibited women from working in the pub-
lic sphere (except health care) and banned all girls above the age of eight from attending
schools. Religious police enforced these edicts through public beating. Laura Grenfell, The
Participation of Afghan Women in the Reconstruction Process, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 22,
22 (2004).
308. Id. at 23. This mirrors the development of western feminism, which focused on
acquisition of the right to vote during its first wave. See Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding
Common Feminist Ground: The Role of the Next Generation in Shaping Feminist Legal
Theory, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 225, 227 (2013); Chamallas, supra note 120, at 157.
309. One example of the toll this has had on women is the extremely high maternal mor-
tality rate. Some suggest that improving education, literacy, and employment opportuni-
ties for women, along with training female health workers, will help reduce Afghanistan’s
high maternal mortality rate. Pfisterer, supra note 47, at 62. Radhika Coomaraswamy
also discusses the positive impact of women’s land ownership:
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what Hussn Banu Ghazanfar, Minister for Women’s Affairs, terms a
“morale of violence.” 310 Certain historical events assist in better un-
derstanding the position of women in contemporary Afghan society.
Under the rule of Amir Abdur Rahman, known in Afghan folklore as
the “Iron Amir,” the central authority challenged cultural and reli-
gious norms concerning women.311 Rahman, for example, abolished
the custom of forcing a widow to marry her deceased husband’s next
of kin, raised the age of marriage and implemented a right to divorce
under specific circumstances.312 Amir Habibullah Khan, who suc-
ceeded his father in 1901, continued the reformist tradition by putting
a ceiling on marriage ceremony expenditures to prevent unnecessary
extravagance, while his wife appeared in public and wore western
clothing.313 Habibullah also supported Mahmud Beg Tarzi’s effort to
encourage women’s participation in the public sphere by establish-
ing a school for girls with an English curriculum.314 In the 1920s,
King Amanullah continued to expand women’s rights, but the process
of reformation stymied with his abdication in 1929.315 Under Prime
Minister Daoud, who served his cousin King Zahir Shah, Afghan
women attained certain basic fundamental rights, particularly in
the field of education.316 In 1959, in a highly controversial move, the
wives and daughters of the Afghan royal family appeared unveiled
in public.317 The first public unveiling since King Amanullah318 high-
lights how radical Afghan society was in the 1960s. The early 1960s
[D]omestic violence might decrease if women have their own plot of land and
their own economic resources. Women’s access to land will also give access to
credit, information, and technology to work the land. Access to land also pro-
vides security against poverty in old age. With access to land, women’s status
and bargaining power will increase dramatically.
Coomaraswamy, supra note 59, at 504.
310. Ghazanfar, supra note 292.
311. Ahmed-Ghosh, Lessons, supra note 75, at 3.
312. Id. at 2–3.
313. Id. at 3.
314. Id. at 4. Between 1911 and 1919, Mahmud Tarzi published a bimonthly newspaper
that included editorials and articles pertaining to women’s rights under Islamic law. Tarzi
even devoted one section to accounts of Namwaran zanan-i jahan (Famous Women of the
World). See id. at 3–4; see also Malikyar, supra note 193, at 392.
315. EWANS, supra note 276, at 93, 96.
316. American diplomat Norman Hannah recalls encounters with Prime Minister Daoud
in the late 1950s and early 1960s during which he saw a succession of cabinet ministers
and their wives appearing before Prime Minister Daoud. Hannah writes that the wives
were not wearing “traditional shrouds, but colorful flowing blouses and vests plus billowing
shelvar—a kind of loose silken trousers fastened at the ankle—and, most important of all,
no veil. All went immediately to pay their respects to the Prime Minister, whose wife also
put in an appearance.” Hannah, supra note 303, at 190.
317. Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and
Iraq, 3 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 1–5 (2005).
318. See id. at 2, 5 (exploring the incorporation of religion into the post-intervention con-
stitutions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the countries’ transitions to Islamic democracy).
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were characterized by substantial economic reforms, such as road
construction, and a more democratic constitution.319 The 1973 Daoud
Revolution and the ensuing two decades of conflict, however, in-
creasingly undermined the limited gains made by women.320 Such
progress was reversed completely when the Taliban rose to power
in the mid-1990s.321 While Daoud and the PDPA government intro-
duced measures that empowered women,322 the Taliban, with its
unique brand of Islam, drove women from the public sphere, forbade
women from working outside of the home and introduced a new moral
code that more closely regulated the movement of women and dimin-
ished their rights.323
This abbreviated history reveals that Afghan women had greater
freedom to develop and participate in the public sphere before the
advent of conflict, which was accompanied by rising Islamism and
its contrived religious and cultural norms that have negatively im-
pacted women’s position in Afghan society. In twenty-first-century
Afghanistan, the construction of gender is understood in social, reli-
gious and cultural terms, a shift that makes the state less likely to
address the marginalization of women.324 Understandings of gender
also lead “Afghan women [to] discuss gender in the context of social
relations, Islamic religion, culture, domination, subordination and
masculinity. They see gender as a process embedded in all social re-
lations and institutions.” 325
The removal of the Taliban was supposed to usher in a new era
for Afghan women.326 In the initial period following its removal,
319. EWANS, supra note 276, at 119–20. The process of the drafting the new constitution
was significant. In 1963, a seven-man constitutional committee, that included renowned,
liberal Afghan activist Mohammed Siddiq Farhang, was established. Assisted by a French
constitutional adviser, the committee took a year to draft the constitution, which was then
reviewed by a thirty-two-member Constitutional Advisory Commission. The 1964 Loya
Jirga, convened to review and formally approve the included 452 members, four of which
were women. Id. at 120; see also Grenfell, supra note 307, at 23.
320. EWANS, supra note 276, at 130–31.
321. Id. at 206–07.
322. Helena Malikyar notes that the Civil Law of 1977 stated that females are compe-
tent to marry at the age of sixteen and Article 27 of the 1977 Constitution established the
principle of equality between men and women. Malikyar, supra note 193, at 394–95.
323. Telesetsky, supra note 168, at 296.
324. For example, in a recent announcement, the Afghan Ulema Council issued a state-
ment that men and women should not mix in the workplace; this position did not draw any
condemnation from President Karzai. See Bezhan, supra note 29.
325. ELAHEH ROSTAMI-POVEY, AFGHAN WOMEN: IDENTITY AND INVASION 4 (2007).
326. Frida Ghitis points out:
In the Afghan capital, deviating from the strictest interpretation of Islam may
no longer be grounds for death, but as the day-to-day realities of post-Taliban
life become apparent, it is clear that liberation from the tyranny of the
Taliban is a relative matter. In the heady days following the overthrow of the
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women anticipated greater participation in the reconstruction dis-
course.327 Promises regarding the incorporation of women into Afghan
public spaces328 and the process of drafting and ratifying the Afghan
constitution created a sense of optimism.329 Slowly and assuredly,
however, Afghan women have increasingly felt the enmity of tradition
pushing back against their empowerment;330 many of the hopes that
accompanied the 2001 intervention have dissipated and Afghanistan
continues to be ranked as the worst country for women to live in.331
One interesting development has been the appearance of ‘moral
crimes’ which are essentially crimes that are not codified by Afghan
statutes, such as the crime of “running away.” 332
Taliban, as the U.S. rejoiced in its victory, politicians pointed to the freeing
of Afghan women as one of the great victories of the war on terror.
Frida Ghitis, Women Must Be Freed from Koranic Brutalities, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002,
at B13.
327. See Anne Barnard, Women Cherish Taliban Setback, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13,
2001, at A3.
328. Under Article 83 of the Constitution, each province must have at least two female
delegates elected to the Wolesi Jirga:
The elections law shall adopt measures to attain, through the electorate sys-
tem, general and fair representation for all the people of the country, and pro-
portionate to the population of every province, on average, at least two females
shall be the elected members of the House of People from each province.
CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REP. OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 83.
329. Laura Grenfell writes that out of the 1500 delegates who attended the Emergency
Loya Jirga in 2002, whose purpose was to elect the Afghan Transitional Administration,
220 were women. In the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga, around 20 percent of the 500
delegates and seven of the thirty-five members of the Constitutional Commission were
women. Grenfell, supra note 307, at 23.
330. In a 2003 report, the International Crisis Group noted:
The promise of an Afghan government committed to gender equality is so
far more aspiration than fact. This gap between objectives and practices has
several causes, including absence of effective governmental structures through
which gender policy can be crafted and implemented; failure to acknowledge
the deep social structures that incorporate inequitable gender norms; and
absence of broad public support for such reforms.
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG), ICG ASIA REPORT NO. 48, AFGHANISTAN WOMEN AND
RECONSTRUCTION 1 (2003), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south
-asia/afghanistan/048%20-%20Afghanistan%20-%20Women%20and%20Reconstruction
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R85K-CGCK.
331. See Bowcott, supra note 3; see also Benazeer Roshan, The More Things Change, The
More They Stay the Same: The Plight of Afghan Women Two Years After the Overthrow
of the Taliban, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 270, 271, 276 (2004) (highlighting the limited
progress toward empowering women in post-Taliban Afghanistan); Nazia, Afghanistan: My
Husband Cut Off My Ears and Nose and Broke My Teeth, IRIN NEWS (Dec. 26, 2007), http://
www.irinnews.org/HOVReport.aspx?ReportId=76003, archived at http://perma.cc/LF7N
-6YX8 [hereinafter Nazia, Afghanistan].
332. For an in-depth review of the crime of “running away” see Human Rights Watch,
“I Had To Run Away”: The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for “Moral Crimes” in
Afghanistan, 5 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghani
stan0312webwcover_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V8K3-WHVX.
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1. The Afghan Constitution, Women and the Supreme Court
The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan was accompanied by prom-
ises of improved conditions for Afghan women.333 The new constitu-
tion, drafted in 2003 and ratified in 2004, was touted as “the most
enlightened [constitution] in the Islamic world.”334 Barnett Rubin, a
former adviser to UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Lakhdar
Brahimi during the 2001 Bonn talks and a leading expert on Afghani-
stan, writes that the 502 delegates to the Afghan Constitutional Loya
Jirga (Grand Council) who approved the new constitution
hoped that this relatively liberal Islamic constitution would provide
a framework for the long task of consolidating basic state struc-
tures, as the country struggled to emerge from decades of anti-
Soviet jihad, interfactional and interethnic civil war, and wars of
conquest and resistance by and against the radical Islamists of
the Taliban movement.335
In other words, there was very little about gender equality as the
focus was more on adopting legislation and implementing it, which
meant that from the donor country the assumption was that once a
Western-based normative system emerged in Afghanistan it would
begin the process of undoing discriminatory practices.336 This section
therefore emphasizes the value constitutions hold as the essence of
a rule of law system.337 What has become apparent in Afghanistan is
that the constitution may promote equality, but if government and
judicial institutions opt not to impose the law or interpret the law in
a certain way, having a legal mechanism to prevent discrimination
is redundant.
Afghan constitutional history began on April 9, 1923 when the
country adopted its first constitution.338 The constitution included
333. See Richard Benedetto, Bush Details New Initiatives to Aid Afghanistan, USA
TODAY, June 16, 2004, at A6.
334. Zalmay Khalilzad, Afghanistan’s Milestone, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2004, at A17.
335. Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, 15 J. OF DEMOCRACY
5, 5 (2004).
336. See id.
337. The 2004 Constitution is Afghanistan’s sixth constitution. The hierarchy of Afghan
domestic law begins with the Constitution, which is binding upon all courts. When no con-
stitutional provision on a given subject exists, courts may look to statutory legislation.
Article 130 of the Constitution permits the usage of shari’a. Should shari’a not exist under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, courts may use customary law. SHEILA REED, CONOR FOLEY &
HAMAYOUN HAMED, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW ORGANIZATION REPORT, EVALU-
ATION REPORT 2008 (Afghanistan) 16 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.idlo.org/DOC
News/277DOC1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XKR3-EAZR.
338. Travis, supra note 317, at 3.
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a number of provisions that evidenced a desire to pursue neoliberal
values, such as gender equality.339 A commitment to neoliberal norms
also appears in the preamble to the 2004 Constitution, which af-
firms the country’s faith in both God and democratic values.340 This
affirmation indicates the drafters’ desire to strike a balance between
Islamic and neoliberal values.341 In principle, the Afghan constitution
complies with international standards regarding gender and women’s
rights, providing for constitutional guarantees of gender equality342
and the representation of Afghan women in Parliament.343 In spite of
these constitutional provisions, the status of women remains weak
in Afghanistan.344 Women continue to be killed for challenging Afghan
cultural and religious norms.345 They also continue to endure domestic
violence346 and encounter obstacles that prevent them from attaining
equal rights.347
Although this reality is the product of numerous factors, two have
exacted the greatest influence: Islam and culture. Islam and culture
are intertwined in contemporary Afghanistan, making it difficult to
339. CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 16, Apr. 9, 1923 (stating that all Afghans
should be accorded equal rights under the law, thus espousing gender equality).
340. CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN pmbl., Jan. 26, 2004.
341. The preamble declares: “Believing firmly in Almighty God, relying on His divine
will, and adhering to the Holy religion of Islam. . . .” It further states that the people of
Afghanistan will observe “the United Nations Charter as well as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.” Id.
342. Article 22 of the Constitution declares, “The citizens of Afghanistan, man and
woman, have equal rights and duties before the law.” Id. art. 22.
343. The Afghan Parliament is bicameral; it has a lower house—Wolesi Jirga (Council
of People)—and an upper house—Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders). KENNETH KATZMAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RS21922 AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE 9 (2014), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/rpw/RS21922.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/AJP8-DYFY.
344. Pfisterer, supra note 47, at 73–74 (arguing that Afghanistan regularly violates
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees a right to life);
see also Jennifer Kristen Lee, Legal Reform to Advance the Rights of Women in Afghanistan
Within the Framework of Islam, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 531, 532–33 (2009).
345. See Mustafa Andalib & Mirwais Harooni, Hundreds of Afghan Girls’ Schools Close:
Karzai Calls on Taliban to Stop Campaign Against Education, REUTERS, May 10, 2012, at
A6; Mirwais Harooni, Women, Children Beheaded in Afghan ‘Honour Killing,’ REUTERS,
July 4, 2012, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/04/afghanistan-honourkilling
-idINDEE8630DN20120704, archived at http://perma.cc/NWP7-GSWU; William Marsden,
Afghan Women with Jobs Killed, VICTORIA TIMES COLONIST, Aug. 17, 2011, at A9.
346. See, e.g., Nazia, Afghanistan, supra note 331 (recounting the story of a sixteen-year-
old bride and the violence that she endured at the hands of her forty-year-old husband).
347. The killing of Afghan actress Benafsha in September 2012 provides a clear example
of the violence women endure. Benafsha and two friends, in response to death threats, were
in the process of relocating to a different part of Kabul, when she was stabbed outside of
a Mosque. Her two friends were arrested and subjected to virginity tests. Emma Graham-
Harrison, Kabul Attack on Female Actors Leaves Survivors Facing More Punishments,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2012) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/06/afghanistan
-attack-female-actors?print, archived at http://perma.cc/TFC2-8MT9.
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identify where culture begins and religion ends.348 Years of conflict,
external interventions, and a faith in religious solutions have linked
Afghan cultural norms with militant interpretations of Islam.349 The
dominant madhhab (school of law) in Afghanistan since 1747 has been
Hanifi.350 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Chairman of the International
Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (LAIS) in Malaysia and a mem-
ber of the Afghan Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), has
argued that cultural practices have undermined women’s rights in
Afghanistan.351 Kamali argues that “the ubiquitous practice of child
marriage, exorbitant bride price (walwar), and dower (mahr), forced
marriage not only of widows but also of adult boys and girls, and
widespread abuses of guardianship powers” 352 are largely customary
rather than Islamic practices.353 The sale and exchange of women,
also a customary practice not based on Islamic law, continues to take
place in Afghanistan.354 The Afghan Ministry of Hajj and Religious
Affairs has counseled patience in challenging this practice. According
to Dai-ul-Haq Abed, Deputy Minister of Hajj and Religious Affairs,
“[t]he phenomenon is decreasing but not eradicated.” 355 Reportedly,
one way in which Islam and culture come together to undermine
women’s rights is through the punishment of women and girls that
leave their homes without permission from their mahram (husband
or male relative).356 This “crime” is discretionary, which means that
the police, prosecutors and judges use their discretionary powers
under the Afghan Penal Code to prosecute women for attempting to
commit zina often on circumstantial evidence.357 Thus, generally what
follows is that the individual is accused of running away from home
enabling Afghan authorities to investigate the “crime” as an attempted
zina (engaging in sexual intercourse outside of marriage) or as a
ta’zir (crimes not mentioned in the Qur’an, thus allowing for judicial
348. EWANS, supra note 276, at 6.
349. Historically, Afghanistan was not known as a hotbed for Islamic militancy. Decades
of conflict and foreign intervention, however, have fueled this development. See Ashraf
Ghani, Islam and State-Building in a Tribal Society of Afghanistan: 1880–1901, 12
MODERN ASIAN STUD. 269, 270 (1978); see also EWANS, supra note 276, at 9.
350. Malikyar, supra note 193, at 390–91. The Hanafi School is one of the four schools
of Islamic jurisprudence within Sunni Islam named after Abu Hanifa ibn Thabt. It started
in Iraq. Its influence expanded eastward so that it is the dominant school in Central Asia
and the Subcontinent. Id.
351. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, References to Islam and Women in the Afghan
Constitution, 22 ARAB L.Q. 270, 299 (2008).
352. Id. Kamali argues that his intervention led to the adoption of Article 54, which
calls for the elimination of tribal customs contrary to Islam.
353. Id. at 295, 299.
354. Abrahimkhil, supra note 304.
355. Id.
356. UNAMA, supra note 5, at 16–17.
357. Id.
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discretion on how to administer them).358 Moreover, the Afghan
Supreme Court has taken the position that if a woman has difficul-
ties within the home, running away is not a solution, as the Court
expects the woman to seek government help, whether it is from the
police, government agency or judicial institution.359
Since the U.S.-led invasion, the Afghan judicial system360 and
its judges have been a disappointment in the struggle for women’s
rights.361 The three institutions that oversee the judicial system—
the Supreme Court, the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry
of Justice—frequently engage in turf wars.362 Prosecutors, police of-
ficers and international advisors interviewed by the International
Crisis Group in Kabul, Parwan and Nangarhar identified poor rela-
tions between the three branches as the primary cause of corruption
and the weak rule of law.363 Corruption is rife.364 Judges are poorly
358. See id.; see also N. J. Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, 6
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49, 53 (1957) (noting that the purpose of ta’zir, which means to prevent,
is “to serve as a correction for the offender himself and a deterrent for others”).
359. Human Rights Watch, supra note 332, at 5.
360. The Constitution provides for a three-tier judicial system comprised of the Supreme
Court (Stera Mahkama), High Court (Appeal Courts), and Primary Courts. The Ministry
of Justice is composed of two departments—a legal drafting department (the Taqnin) and
a law department (the Hoquq). Each province and many districts have a separate law de-
partment that conducts preliminary investigations and often mediates cases before they
are brought to court. The Taqnin is responsible for reviewing draft laws and national
legislation to ensure compliance with the Constitution, Islamic law and international legal
standards. The Office of the Prosecutor General, an independent body, is constitutionally
charged with investigating and prosecuting cases. REED, supra note 337, at 15–16.
361. See Choudhury, supra note 72, at 198.
The structural characteristics of the Afghan legal system—the politicization
and gender-bias of the judiciary, the weakness of the formal legal system,
and the lack of clarity surrounding applicable law—render judicial review a
serious threat to enactment and enforcement of women’s rights legislation.
They also suggest the existence of serious institutional barriers to persuading
judges to adopt understandings of Islamic and Afghan law that encompass
women’s rights.
Id.
362. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN
AFGHANISTAN, SPECIAL REPORT 117, 6 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/files
/resources/sr117.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3TG5-H4Z4.
363. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ICG ASIA REPORT NO. 195, REFORMING AFGHANI-
STAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY 1, 13 (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org
/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken
%20Judiciary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3JYU-VBTY; see also Vasilios Tasikas,
Developing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Need for a New Strategic Paradigm,
2007 ARMY LAW. 45, 52–53.
364. In February 2012, the Afghan Supreme Court dismissed and prosecuted sixty
Afghan judges for involvement in administrative corruption. Afghan Judges Arrested and
Tried for Corruption Charges, KHAAMA PRESS (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://www
.khaama.com/afghan-judges-arrested-and-tried-for-corruption-charges-774, archived at
http://perma.cc/Y7XT-QRE7.
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trained by365 a judicial education system that requires law students
to follow either a religious Islamic legal education or a non-religious
legal education.366 The structure of legal training contributes to the
lack of clarity regarding interpretation of laws and what type of law
a judge should apply. Most judges interpret laws, especially laws
addressing gender issues,367 conservatively.368
The limited authority of the Afghan Supreme Court also affects
the empowerment of women. The Supreme Court “has limited adminis-
trative authority in the provinces, and even less ‘legal’ authority—in
the sense that it does not cast an [sic] legalistic or intellectual shadow
over the judiciary as a whole.” 369 The Court, which has nine justices,
all of whom are men, consistently fails to promote, protect and en-
hance women’s rights.370 The Court’s conservative religious agenda
dates back to its first chief justice, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious
conservative who lacked both legal and formal religious training.371
Shinwari’s appointment came out of political consideration, as he was
an ally of President Karzai.372 He brought a tremendous conservative
(religious) support because he was previously a head of a madras,
a position that fostered his acceptance among clerics and mullahs
around the country.373 Although Shinwari has left the bench, many
365. Lee, supra note 344, at 545.
366. Geoffrey Swenson and Eli Sugerman discuss deep structural flaws within the
Afghan legal education system, claiming that “nobody, including the Afghan government,
knows how lawyers practice in Afghanistan.” Geoffrey Swenson & Eli Sugerman, Building
the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Importance of Legal Education, 3 HAGUE J. ON THE
RULE OF L. 130 (2011).
367. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) has found that
prosecutors and the Afghan National Police tend to refer cases to jirgas and shuras for ad-
vice or resolution. The Report notes that this practice “often undermined implementation
of the EVAW law and reinforced harmful practices.” UNAMA, supra note 5, at 4.
368. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 363, at 14.
369. J. Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan 9 (Ctr. on
Democracy, Dev. & the Rule of Law, Stanford Inst. for Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 19,
2004), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20714/Reestablishing_the_Judiciary
_in_Afghanistan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MHG8-P6Lb.
370. Nina Shea notes that soon after Afghanistan’s post-Taliban cabinet was announced,
the Fazul Hadi Shinwari denounced Sima Samar, Afghanistan’s first Minister of Women’s
Affairs for speaking out “against the Islamic nation of Afghanistan.” Samar was charged
with blasphemy for allegedly telling a Canadian that she did not believe in shari’a. Nina
Shea, Sharia in Kabul?, NAT’L REV., Oct. 28, 2002, at 20.
371. In a 2003 op-ed, Preeta D. Bansal and Felice D. Gaer recall a meeting with Chief
Justice Shinwari in which he made clear that Qur’anic law alone governs freedom of
expression, freedom of religion, and equality between men and women. Preeta D. Bansal
& Felice D. Gaer, Opinion, Silenced Again in Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, http://www
.nytimes.com/2003/10/01/opinion/silenced-again-in-kabul.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm,
archived at http://perma.cc/67NQ-G3NE.
372. Carlotta Gall, Afghan Lawmakers Review Court Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2006, at A.10.
373. Id.
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of his judicial appointees (who also lack a legal education) remain on
the bench and the Court has maintained its conservative attitude to-
wards religious freedom, freedom of expression and gender equality.374
The Court, for example, has concluded that Article 42 of the Law on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which prohibits the
postponement, pardoning or reduction in sentence for those found
guilty of committing an act of violence against women, breaches the
Afghan constitution.375 The Court has continued to undercut women’s
rights when in August 2010, for example, it issued Supreme Court
Approval 572, designed to provide guidance to prosecutors engaged
in the potential prosecution of women accused of attempted zina.376
Instead of clarifying the situation, what Supreme Court Approval 572
has done is provide the police and prosecution with the authority to
examine the purpose as to why the woman had run away, as opposed
to accepting that preventing a woman from leaving her home without
permission is a fundamental breach of her right, leading UNAMA
to note the investigator needs to determine a female’s marital status
and the place from where she ran.377 Though her motive for leaving
is considered, there is no instruction to investigate the potential per-
petrator of violence against her should it be concluded the woman fled
her home due to violence.378 In most cases, unless a woman or girl is
able to prove that she left her house to escape violence and went to an
institution deemed appropriate (i.e., a DoWA), she is suspected of
“attempted zina.” 379
2. The Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA)
The 2001 Bonn Agreement paved the way for the establishment
of an Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA).380 The Ministry
374. In a 2010 report, the International Crisis Group stated that the Supreme Court
operates as a bully pulpit for Islamist fundamentalists linked to Saudi-backed jihadist
Abd ul-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 363, at 13.
375. The Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW), Art. 40–42,
Aug. 1, 2009, available at http://www.laoa.af/laws/law_on_eliminaton_of_violence_against
_women.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VZ59-MQCY [hereinafter EVAW]. According to
the United Nations, the Court ruled on July 27, 2011 that the measure breaches the con-
stitution because it limits the power of the president to grant pardons. UNAMA, supra
note 5, at 8.
376. UNAMA, supra note 5, at 16–17.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 19.
379. Id. at 7.
380. GENDER AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANI-
STAN, JOINT WORKSHOP OF THE UNITED NATIONS INTER-AGENCY NETWORK ON WOMEN AND
GENDER EQUALITY AND THE OECD-DAC NETWORK ON GENDER EQUALITY (July 10–11,
2003); see also Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, III(A)(3), IV(2), V(4). Annex IV
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was entrusted with the duty of advancing the role of women in
Afghan society and with the responsibility of coordinating govern-
ment initiatives to promote the inclusion of women in Afghan social
life.381 Although MoWA was created to help end gender inequality in
Afghanistan,382 the fact that Afghanistan was recently identified as
the worst country for women to live in suggests that MoWA has not
been effective. Its ineffectiveness is arguably attributable to the nature
of Islamic education in Afghanistan. Muslim feminists such as Fatima
Gailani, president of the Afghan Red Crescent Society, identify the
type of Islam taught in Afghanistan as the source of discrimination.383
Gailani also emphasizes the role of the family—the private sphere—
in fostering discriminatory practices against women.384
MoWA’s ineffectiveness can also be attributed to the difficult con-
ditions under which it operates. MoWA has to contend with a fickle
president and political system that does not value MoWA’s efforts to
empower women, treating it instead as a tool to appease the interna-
tional community.385 Although President Karzai publicly supports the
(Dec. 22, 2001) available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/commu
nique03.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6FQL-PTTL.
381. WORLD BANK, AFGHANISTAN: NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND POVERTY
REDUCTION—THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN’S FUTURE 4, 8–9 (Mar. 2005), avail-
able at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/Afghanistan
GenderReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M3N3-LNW5.
382. See GENDER AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION LESSONS LEARNED FROM
AFGHANISTAN, supra note 380.
383. Olivia Ward, Afghan President Endorses Cleric’s Code that Downgrades Women’s
Rights, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 7, 2012, at A1.
384. In a 2007 interview Gailani stated:
In most parts of the country women face exactly the same discrimination they
faced five years ago. This discrimination does not come from the govern-
ment; it comes from their own families. Personally, I never think about my
gender, whether I am in the Red Crescent or when I was recently working on
the new Constitution. I had to go from village to village to speak to different
people, sitting in the mosque talking to a congregation of men. I think that
when you reach a certain level of education, people will respect you. But the
dilemma is how to encourage fathers, brothers and families to give this chance
to their daughters.
Franz Rauchenstein, Interview with Ms. Fatima Gailani, President of the Afghan Red
Crescent Society, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 7, 9 (2007); see also Noorjahan Akbar, Justice
for Women, DAILY OUTLOOK AFGHANISTAN, Apr. 16, 2012, http://outlookafghanistan.net
/topics.php?post_id=3959, archived at http://perma.cc/QQ9D-J3DU.
385. In 2012, President Karzai supported a “code of conduct” drafted by the Ulema
Council that declared that women are secondary and men are fundamental. Ward, supra
note 383. President Karzai defended the Council’s declaration, claiming it reflects a re-
ligious perspective that is representative of the people of Afghanistan. Ghanizada, Karzai
Support Ulema’s Declaration on Gender Segregation, KHAAMA PRESS, Mar. 7, 2012, http://
www.khaama.com/karzai-support-ulemas-declaration-on-gender-segregation-814, archived
at http://perma.cc/NRD7-UFKK. But, in a November 2012 radio address President Karzai
claimed that domestic violence is an unacceptable violation of Islamic law. President
Karzai: Violence Against Women May Destroy Families, Office of the President, Islamic
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empowerment of women, he works with conservatives who oppose
women’s empowerment to ensure his political survival.386 For exam-
ple, Karzai supported the establishment of the Ministry of the Hajj
and Religious Affairs (MOHRA) to prevent vice and promote virtue,
much like the notorious Department for the Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice.387 The MOHRA has been slow in addressing un-
Islamic customary practices, such as the selling of women.388 Ques-
tions remain regarding its commitment to reforming Afghan Islamic
practices that have morphed over decades of conflict,389 especially be-
cause the Ulema Council continues to wield enormous influence.390
MoWA also operates with limited funds391 and does not enjoy the same
stature as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior or the
Ministry of Education or Health.392 Suggestions that the minister
Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 12, 2012), http:// president.gov.af/en/news/15111, archived
at http://perma.cc/62B8-G6TN.
386. Pamela Constable noted the Karzai administration supported a campaign to clamp
down on vice “in response to pressure from domestic religious leaders and partly to up-
stage Islamic Taliban insurgents who are stepping up attacks across the south.” Pamela
Constable, In Afghanistan, A Crackdown on Imported Pleasures, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/06/AR2006080600570
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QK8Z-QQBN.
387. Christina Lamb, “Ministry of Vice” Fills Afghan Women with Fear, SUNDAY TIMES,
July 23, 2006, at 23.
388. Abrahimkhil, supra note 304.
389. See, e.g., U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA HR) & Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, HARMFUL TRADITIONAL
PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW ON ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN 1 (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://unama.unmissions.org
/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/YHS2-ZFPB [hereinafter UNAMA HR] (“Afghan men and women interviewed by UNAMA
HR reported that many Afghans believe that practices that subordinate women to the
will of men and sharply limit their realms of activity, originate in the Holy Koran.”).
390. The Council is composed of 150 leading Afghan religious scholars and represents
a network of 3,000 Afghan clerics. KATZMAN, supra note 343, at 47.
391. In 2011, Hussan Ghazanfar claimed that MoWA has a budget of $1 million. Rod
Nordland, Women’s Shelters Waste Funds, Afghan Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A.8.
The budget of the Afghan Human Rights Commission, most of which comes from foreign
donors, is estimated at $7.5 million. Rod Nordland, Critics Question Karzai Choices for
Human Rights Panel, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2013, at A.4.
392. In 2011, fourteen Afghan ministries received direct assistance from USAID and the
State Department. According to information provided to the US Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, the following ministries receive U.S. aid: Ministry of Finance ($30
million), Ministry of Communications and Information Technology ($1 million), Ministry
of Public Health ($236.5 million), USAID Salary Sup Special Posts ($2 million), Ministry
of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, Independent Directorate of Local Governance
($85 million), Ministry of Finance and World Bank ($2,079.5 million), Ministry of Education
($25 million through Danish Development Agency), Ministry of Transportation and Civil
Aviation ($6 million). No information was provided for the Ministry of Counter Narcotics,
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Attorney General’s Office, or Ministry of 
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owes her position to the president has not helped matters. Such beliefs
foster concern that the minister will pursue the president’s agenda,393
while failing to address issues of competency, corruption and account-
ability that have characterized the Karzai administration.394 MoWA’s
agenda has been shaped by cultural and traditional norms, the rising
level of Islamism and the politicization of women’s rights.395 Because
women remain in the margins of society,396 MoWA focuses primarily
on resolving abuse and elopement and opening training centers in
select areas of the country.397 Donors have not effectively intervened
to help improve the situation; most provide aid to specific programs398
or do not provide enough aid.399 Notably, the donors rarely consult
with the ministry, and programs are often subsumed by political de-
bates about the rights of women.400
Interior. MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 112TH CONG., EVALUATING U.S.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN 20, note 69 (Comm. Print 2011).
393. See, e.g., Manizha Naderi, This Is a Blatant Bid to Curb the Rights of Afghan
Women, THE TIMES (UK), Feb. 16, 2011, at 20.
394. Reportedly, it costs around $100,000 to become a provincial police chief, $25,000
to settle a lawsuit and $6,000 to bribe the police. Dexter Filkins, Bribes Corrode Afghan’s
Trust in Government, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at A1.
395. Some claim that the Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture called on women
TV presenters to avoid heavy makeup and wear headscarves in February 2012 to show the
Taliban, with which it was seeking to negotiate, that the government’s agenda comported
with the Taliban’s commitment to institute Islamic precepts. Mina Habib, Afghan Clerics’
Conservative Blueprint for Women, INSTITUTE FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Mar. 7,
2012, http://iwpr.net/report-news/afghan-clerics-conservative-blueprint-women, archived
at http://perma.cc/6BGH-BY38.
396. During the 2009 election, for example, “a combination of fear, tradition, apathy
and poor planning conspired to deprive many Afghan women of rights they had only re-
cently begun to exercise.” Pamela Constable, Many Women Stayed Away From the Polls
In Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2009, at A1. According to reports, insecurity pre-
vented women from voting in many districts. As a result, some men voted on behalf of
women. Id.
397. See, e.g., MEDICA MONDIALE, WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN,
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 32 (2007),
available at http://www.medicamondiale.org/fileadmin/redaktion/5_Service/Mediathek
/Dokumente/English/Documentations_studies/medica_mondiale_-_Report_on_Women
__Peace_and_Security_-_October_2007.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5V95-2N6J.
398. Roya Rahmani, Donors, Beneficiaries, or NGOs: Whose Needs Come First? A
Dilemma in Afghanistan, 22 DEV. IN PRAC. 295, 295 (2012) (noting that donors’ lack of
understanding of local context has a detrimental effect on local NGO work). Isobel Coleman
notes that total USAID funding for educational initiatives between 2004 and 2006 was
only $100 million, most of which was devoted to handicap-accessible, earthquake-proof
school construction. Coleman, supra note 299, at 61.
399. Afghan Women Want Tokyo [to] Push Socio-economic Agenda, PAJHWOK REPORT,
June 25, 2012, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/06/25/afghan-women-want-tokyo-push
-socio-economic-agenda, archived at http://perma.cc/79WC-7AAF.
400. This is evident in the debate about who should manage women’s shelters. The
Afghan government depicted the shelters as inefficient and corrupt because it wanted 
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3. The Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW)
In August 2009, Afghanistan adopted the EVAW, which is de-
signed to protect women and girls.401 Notably, President Karzai, who
introduced the measure as an executive decree, signed EVAW into
law six years after his interim government had ratified—without
reservations—the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), which Babrak Karmal had signed on
August 14, 1980.402 The 2009 legislation criminalizes child marriages,
forced marriages, the selling and buying of women for the purpose of
marriage, the use of women and girls for conflict resolution, killing,
torture, rape and other kinds of violence,403 forced isolation,404 forced
self-immolation405 and denying women the right to education, work
and health services.406 EVAW also prescribes preventive measures407
for implementation by seven government ministries to help end
to control these institutions. Naderi, supra note 393, at 20. Others claim that foreigners use
the shelters to convert Afghans to Christianity. Maria Abi-Habib, TV Host Targets Afghan
Women’s Shelters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748704875004575374984291866528.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LW2X-BQ7H.
401. UNAMA, supra note 5, at 1.
402. Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, CEDAW and Afghanistan, 11 J. INT’L WOMEN
STUD. 136, 141–42 (2009). Afghanistan acceded to the CEDAW on March 5, 2003. It is
also a signatory to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified Apr. 24, 1983); the
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ratified Apr. 24, 1983); the Covenant
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ratified Aug. 5, 1983); the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (ratified Mar. 4, 2003); the Convention
Against Torture (ratified June 26, 1987); and the Convention on the rights of the Child
(ratified Apr. 27, 1994) and its optional protocols on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution,
and Child Pornography and On the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (ratified
Sept. 24, 2003). Id.; Lee, supra note 344, at 541–42; Alissa J. Rubin, Effort to Strengthen
an Afghan Law on Women May Backfire, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2013, at A8.
403. Akbar, supra note 384.
404. Article 31 declares: “It is a crime to isolate a woman in the home, or from her
relatives.” EVAW, supra note 375, at art. 31. It further states: “The offender may be sen-
tenced to a maximum of 3 months in prison.” Id.
405. “It is illegal to mistreat women in ways that push them to burn themselves, swallow
poison, or commit suicide. The punishment is more severe if the woman suffers injury
or disability from these actions.” Id. art. 21.
406. Preventing or forbidding a girl or a woman from attending school or univer-
sity, from working outside the home, or from visiting doctors for treatment
is a crime. It is against the law for a father, brother, husband, any relative
or stranger to prohibit women’s access to education, work, or medical care.
A person who does that will be punished with up to 6 months in prison.
Id. art. 35.
407. These measures refer to such actions as the prevention of violence (art. 4) in which
the law calls for the punishment of the offender. Moreover the act states that the infliction
of violence whether in public or private area is prohibited. The Act also called for protective
and supportive measures thus under art. 8, MoWA in cooperation with other government
ministries and agencies should help increase awareness as to the rights of men and women,
highlighting the obligation to end violence against women. Id. art. 4.
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violence against women.408 In 2013, Fawzia Kofi, a member of the
Afghan Parliament introduced the EVAW, arguing for its adoption
as a legislative measure instead of a presidential decree that can be
reversed by a subsequent president.409
Debates surrounding EVAW have highlighted the continued per-
vasiveness of misogyny and contrived cultural values. Those opposing
EVAW claim it breaches, disregards and undermines Islamic law,410
particularly provisions criminalizing child marriage and forced mar-
riage, banning the traditional practice of exchanging girls and women
to settle disputes, making domestic violence a punishable crime,
protecting rape victims from prosecution for adultery, limiting the
number of wives a man can have to two and establishing shelters for
battered women.411
The key issue with the legislation is that on the one hand it per-
mits a victim of violence to approach the police, the Afghan Human
Rights Commission, the Department of Women’s Affairs or prosecu-
tors, but at the same time it appears that there is a great demand to
mediate the situation as opposed to prosecute, largely because this
is deemed to challenge the family unit.412 In other words, there are
cultural and social elements that undermine the development of a
culture that demands protection for victims of violence and the prose-
cution of those that commit such acts.413 Additionally, what is also
troubling about the legislation is that if a compromise is reached
after a conviction, the sentence is not imposed.414
408. UN Welcomes Statement by Afghanistan Confirming “Running Away” Is Not a
Crime, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID
=43207&Cr=&Cr1=, archived at http://perma.cc/K2WG-NDKN.
409. Feminist Newswire, Afghan Violence Against Women Law Blocked in Parliament,
FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND. BLOG, May 20, 2013, http://feminist.org/blog/index.php/2013
/05/20/afghan-violence-against-women-law-blocked-in-parliament/, archived at http://
perma.cc/K9CS-KQY2.
410. Saleha Soadat, Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women Dropped by
Parliament, TOLONEWS (May 18, 2013), http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/10536
-law-on-elimination-of-violence-against-women-dropped-by-parliament, archived at http://
perma.cc/8URR-29MG.
411. For example, Obaidullah Barekzai, a Member of Parliament from Southeast
Urozgan Province, asserted that the prohibition against allowing parents to marry their
daughter if she is under the age of sixteen contravenes Islamic law and practices.
Barekzai claimed that Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddiq, a companion of the Prophet Mohammed,
married off his daughter when she was seven. Controversy Over Elimination of Violence
Against Women Law, DAILY OUTLOOK AFGHANISTAN, May 21, 2013, http://www.outlook
afghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=7420, archived at http://perma.cc/CB47-LVA9.
412. UNAMA, supra note 5, at iii, 22–24.
413. The attempt to introduce the EVAW in parliament failed with a number of parlia-
mentarians declaring that the articles were un-Islamic, with one member going so far as
to state “[i]f the safe houses are approved by parliament you will witness millions martyrs
[sic] in this country.” Soadat, supra note 410.
414. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, A WAY TO GO: AN UPDATE ON IMPLAN-
TATION OF THE LAW ON ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN
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A 2012 study by UNAMA examining the presidential decree
discussed some indicators of progress, but concluded that “the over-
all use of the law remained low indicating there is still a long way
to go before women and girls in Afghanistan are fully protected from
violence through the law.” 415 The report included three additional
key findings (not including an increase in violence against women)
that expose the limited impact of EVAW on women’s empowerment
in post-Taliban Afghanistan: (1) police and prosecutors frequently
rely on traditional institutions controlled by powerful men to resolve
violations; (2) women who turn to traditional institutions to resolve
domestic disputes often remain at risk because tradition dictates that
women who flee abuse must be returned to their families; (3) officials
remain reluctant to arrest individuals accused of violence against
women if they are connected to armed groups, including government-
sanctioned groups such as the Arbaki, Afghan Local Police (ALP).416
In December 2013, a new report was issued and its findings are
troubling because they emphasized “that encouraging increases in
reporting and registration of incidents of violence against women by
police and prosecutors did not lead to a similar increase in the use
of the EVAW law to resolve cases by prosecutors and courts particu-
larly through criminal prosecution.” 417
The principal piece of legislation EVAW adopted to protect women
and, by extension, promote and cement their rights has clearly failed.
Domestic violence has increased418 and violence against women con-
tinues to go either unpunished or underpunished.419 MoWA lacks the
influence necessary to impose its agenda on Afghan society and men
continue to control the discourse about women’s rights.420 Women’s
rights remain under attack.421
12 (Dec. 2013), available at http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents
/UNAMA%20REPORT%20on%20EVAW%20LAW_8%20December%202013.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/829G-Q6DP [hereinafter UNAMA 2013].
415. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, STILL A LONG WAY TO GO: IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE LAW ON ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN 2
(Dec. 2012), available at http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Qy9m
DiEa5Rw%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US, archived at http://perma.cc/XXJ5-XX98.
416. Id. at 4.
417. UNAMA 2013, supra note 414, at 3.
418. In 2011, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission declared that
more than 39,000 incidents of violence against women had been registered in a nine-
month period. MoWA estimated only 6,000 cases of violence in 2010. Abasin Zaheer,
Senators Call for Giving Women Due Rights, PAJHWOK AFGHAN NEWS, Nov. 27, 2011,
http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/11/27/senators-call-giving-women-due-rights, archived
at http://perma.cc/QA5H-3D5X.
419. See UNAMA 2013, supra note 414, at 18–19.
420. Id. at 21, 25, 37.
421. See, e.g., Maria Abi-Habib, Afghan Women Fear Rights Will Erode as U.S. Leaves,
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B. Non-Governmental Organizations and Afghan Women: RAWA
The role of Afghani and international NGOs in enhancing
women’s rights has increased since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.422
Domestic and international NGOs have enjoyed a greater freedom
to operate than they did under the Taliban and have been instrumen-
tal in helping many Afghan girls and women access education and
employment.423 The extent of this access, however, remains under-
explored and successes are difficult to gauge.424 Afghan women ac-
tivists, including those affiliated with international NGOs, work in a
challenging environment425 that renders it difficult to provide a com-
prehensive review of all work within the NGO sector.426 The Afghan
NGO community adheres to Muslim feminism, but some of its mem-
bers take a more Islamist stance427 and others strive to balance inter-
national human rights norms with Afghan and Muslim values.428
The Revolutionary Afghan Women Association (RAWA), a leading
Afghan NGO, was established in 1977 by Afghan poet Meena Kishwar
Kamal to facilitate the participation of Afghan women in all aspects of
public life.429 To understand RAWA and place it in context—whether
within the Afghan social, political and cultural system or in relation
WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732443980457
8109492792634554.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6XYF-FKSY.
422. The International Development Law Organization (IDLO) has been instrumental
in establishing Violence Against Women Unit within the Attorney General’s Office. Since
its opening in 2010, the Unit has received 237 cases, an average of twenty-six monthly
(December 2010). The monthly caseload has nearly doubled since the Violence Against
Women Unit was established. IDLO has also published a booklet describing crimes against
women. INT’L DEV. LAW ORG., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2010), available at http://www.idlo
.org/Publications/AR2010_En.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5FJY-ZCPS.
423. Telesetsky, supra note 168, at 297–300.
424. See Jennifer L. Fluri, Feminist-Nation Building in Afghanistan: An Examination
of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), 89 FEMINIST REV.
34, 36 (2008).
425. For example, in June 2012, the Afghan Justice Minister for example claimed that
women’s shelters encourage “immorality and prostitution.” Graham Bowley, New Worries
About Women’s Rights and Ethnic Tensions Emerge in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2012, at A8.
426. See Rahmani, supra note 398, at 301.
427. Parliamentarian and activist Fawzia Koofi argues that one way to improve the lives
of women is to engage with the religious polity. She stated: “[t]he role of the mullahs is
crucial because we’re an Islamic nation and the mosques are being used against women.
Why not use them for women?” Miram Arghandiwal, Afghan Women, Clerics, Eye Unlikely
Alliance to Improve Rights, REUTERS (July 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2013/07/16/us-afghanistan-women-idUSBRE96F0CF20130716, archived at http://perma
.cc/3GAB-QLE7.
428. Pamela Constable, A Taboo Issue in Afghan Campaign: As Millions of Women Pre-
pare to Vote, Debate on their Other Rights is Dampened, WASH. POST., Sept. 8, 2004, at A14.
429. MELODY ERMACHILD CHAVIS, MEENA: HEROINE OF AFGHANISTAN 55–66 (2003);
Drucilla Cornell, Gender and September 11: A Roundtable: For RAWA, 28 SIGNS 433, 434
(2002).
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to feminism—it is important to appreciate that RAWA did not begin
as a political movement.430 RAWA has taken, and continues to take,
the position that acknowledging the social, cultural and religious limi-
tations that Afghan women face on a daily basis would render it eas-
ier to provide Afghan women, mainly in rural areas, with rights.431
Accordingly, RAWA regularly strives not to offend or challenge reli-
gious or tribal norms, which means that its engagement in political
discourse, for example, occurs through its involvement in the social
sphere, while being conscious of Islamic principles.432 Thus, RAWA
helps women to recognize that the negative treatment of women is
unacceptable and mobilizes to bring about positive change.433 Jennifer
Fluri explains:
RAWA remains outside the public political centre while enacting
patriarchal reforms within kinship groups and through politically
charged social programmes within the spaces of its private and
clandestine operations. These political strategies, at times, mirror
conventional and conservative methods for socially reproducing
the organization’s future membership and developing “citizens”
for its idealized and ideologically constructed feminist nation.434
The key challenges faced by RAWA in post-Taliban Afghanistan
are substantial and have been impacted by the shifting nature of
the public-private divide. During the period of Soviet Jihad and the
Taliban, RAWA had to work quietly and out of the public eye in order
to provide women with basic support.435 In the post-Taliban period, as
lines between the private and public have dissipated, RAWA mem-
bers have taken a more careful line to avoid the accusation that they
pose a challenge to Islamic precepts.436 In 2004, for example, Latif
Pedram, a left-leaning writer raised the issue of divorce and polygamy
430. CHAVIS, supra note 429, at 59.
431. See Sonali Kolhatkar, The Impact of U.S. Intervention on Afghan Women’s Rights,
17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 12, 25–27 (2002).
432. In the words of one activist, RAWA “respect[s] Islam. But while any fundamen-
talist force rules Afghanistan—whether it be Taliban or Jehadis (such as the Northern
Alliance)—democracy and secularism cannot be achieved.” Chris Richards, Interview with
RAWA, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, June 1, 2003, at 33.
433. Anne E. Brodsky, et. al. explore the concept of resilience in relation to RAWA. Their
study highlights an initial need for greater consciousness among women and the subse-
quent need for intention, action, reflection and maintenance. Anne E. Brodsky et al.,
Between Synergy and Conflict: Balancing the Processes of Organizational and Individual
Resilience in an Afghan Women’s Community, 47 AM. J. CMTY. PYSCHOL. 217, 220, 224–25,
227–28 (2011).
434. Fluri, supra note 424, at 36.
435. Kolhatkar, supra note 431, at 27–28.
436. Jon Boone, Revolutionaries Within: Burqas Conceal Women’s Dangerous Battle
for Rights: Underground Feminist Groups Has Cell Organisations to Foil Powerful
Enemies, THE GUARDIAN, May 1, 2010, at 29.
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at a women’s forum while campaigning for president by suggesting
that a husband cannot treat four wives equally.437 Safia Siddiqui, a
political activist and member of the group that sponsored the forum,
reacted by claiming that Afghans do not wish to discuss such issues.438
Siddiqui stated, “[t]hese are our Islamic values, and society will ac-
cept us only if we respect those values.” 439 The space in which RAWA
labors to sustain its activities also impacts which issues it chooses
to address. It has, for example, shifted some of its focus to issues of
health440 and children because they garner less attention and gener-
ate less controversy.441 RAWA occupies two spheres: one public (the
Internet) and one private.442 RAWA’s website, which contains criti-
cal views about contemporary Afghan society, resonates with a wider
audience.443 Within Afghanistan, however, RAWA activists commu-
nicating through more traditional means adopt a more temperate
and vigilant attitude to avoid accusations of being anti-Islamic.444
RAWA’s programming must also conform to established gender
roles.445 In its orphanages, for example, girls learn to sew and boys
learn carpentry.446 The political goals of RAWA thus often “do not
extend to the destabilization of gendered labour activities.” 447
CONCLUSION
Discussing the women’s rights movement in the United States,
former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor identified three
437. Constable, supra note 428.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. One could argue that RAWA has returned to its original focus of empowering
women by providing women with healthcare and education. CHAVIS, supra note 429, at
55–66, 162–70.
441. Anne E. Brodsky et al., The Hope in Her Eyes: The Role of Children in Afghan
Women’s Resilience, 82 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 358, 362–64 (2012) (discussing RAWA
and the role of children as protectors; children actively support their mothers’ involvement
with RAWA and allow mothers to disguise their activities).
442. Journalist Jon Boone notes that due to official disapproval RAWA “has many of the
attributes of an underground movement.” Boone compares RAWA to a terrorist organi-
zation because it is forced to operate through a cell structure that protects its 2,000
members. Boone, supra note 436. Fluri writes: “The limits of women’s empowerment are
also bound by the physical structures and spaces controlled by RAWA.” Fluri, supra note
424, at 4.
443. Michael Dartnell, Post-Territorial Insurgency: The Online Activism of the Revolu-
tionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), in 14 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES
151, 167 (2003) (noting that “RAWA has operated its Website on the basis of a global vision,
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core lessons. First, change has to come from the public, not courts
or the legislature.448 According to O’Connor, reform has “a much bet-
ter chance of succeeding when it follows, rather than leads, public
opinion,” 449 because acquiring legal protection when society at large
does not understand its value means very little.450 In the case of
Afghanistan, efforts must focus on encouraging men to see the value
of changing contrived cultural and religious precepts, including un-
derstandings of masculine identities.451 Such a process undoubtedly
raises concerns, because far too often it is the State through its in-
stitutions that is the instigator of discriminatory practices. Never-
theless the issue is that in states such as Afghanistan it is very hard
to institute change unless it is through the State and its institutions.
The second lesson identified by O’Connor is that women’s participa-
tion in the political process is critical because it not only helps shape
policy, but also inspires women to attain positions from which they can
implement policy changes.452 When women inhabit high official and
national leadership positions, the domestic and international scene
transforms.453 Recent attempts to diminish Afghan women’s participa-
tion in the political sphere454 are troubling and demand immediate do-
mestic and international attention.455 The final lesson is that “change
448. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Legal Status of Women: The Journey Toward Equality,
15 J. L. & RELIGION 29, 35 (2000–2001).
449. Id.
450. Id. Writing about Palestinian women, Adrien Katherine Wing argues that changing
the status of women and enhancing women’s rights through the reinterpretation of Islamic
principles requires social change, which is very difficult to obtain. Wing, supra note 166,
at 198.
451. For recommendations on how to engage men in the process of empowering women,
see Anne Angarola, Steven E. Steiner & Shannon Zimmerman, Engaging Men in Women’s
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the utility of using all-female formed police units in U.N. peacekeeping missions).
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can occur only when members of a large group surmount their individ-
ual differences and unite in pursuit of a concrete goal.”456 As O’Connor
aptly noted, “[i]t has only been when we women have cast aside our
differences and forged common ground that we have achieved mean-
ingful change.” 457 In applying these lessons to Afghanistan and the
situation of Afghan women, it becomes clear the liberation of Muslim
women requires building “a solid Muslim feminist jurisprudential
basis which clearly shows that Islam not only does not deprive them
of their rights, but in fact demands these rights for them.”458 Albeit un-
appealing, there exists a vital need to more effectively engage Afghan
men and foster male support for the empowerment of women—a goal
that RAWA has effectively pursued since its establishment.459
Beyond restructuring the debate over women’s rights through
the paradigm of Islamic discourse, which necessitates the use of Islam
to challenge what are clear un-Islamic practices when it comes to
women, the public discourse in Afghanistan must shift such that the
empowerment of women is a question of State survival. Adopting
measures such as EVAW without fostering acceptance among the
religious polity or reforming the judiciary only makes the campaign
for women’s rights more difficult because religious and judicial actors
will continue to oppose new measures.460 Furthermore, the economy
and the role that women can play in stimulating economic growth is
also worthy of focus,461 but without addressing issues such as at-
tempted zina and the use of ta’zir, women are unable to leave their
homes without permission. Ultimately, the issue of economic em-
powerment is presented primarily as a development or civil rights
issue rather than an issue of state strength, which therefore means
that insufficient attention is placed on economic empowerment.462
In contemporary Afghanistan, women only contribute five percent
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457. Id.
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to the country’s economic output, for two main reasons: first, the
country has not developed a comprehensive economic strategy and
second, the government continues to allow cultural and religious
norms to undermine women’s economic empowerment.463 If one looks
at such agencies as the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency
(AISA), whose mission is to attract foreign investment, the focus is
very much on men.464
Individuals have attempted to engage with MOHRA,465 even
though the program lacks funds, because the Afghan government
anticipates the withdrawal of international military support in 2014
and pending compromise with the Taliban.466 The Afghan government
views a relationship with the Taliban, which has been reluctant to
pursue the empowerment of women, as more important than gender
equality.467 This may explain why Karzai has neither opposed some
of the legislative changes that have weakened the positions of women,
nor demanded substantial reforms within the judicial branch to ad-
dress the failings of the courts.468 Other ministries, such as those
of education and justice, and non-state actors, such as the Ulema
Council, must also participate in the process because they receive
more funding than MoWA and wield more influence.469 Empowering
women and ending discrimination are state strength issues. Ulti-
mately, the argument is somewhat counterintuitive, holding that if
the Afghan government wished to end discriminatory practices, as
evidenced by its willingness to sign the international human rights
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conventions, then it follows that its lack of widespread authority
facilitates its decision not to use valuable resources to promote a
policy it knows could bring about its downfall.470
Evoking state strength renders possible the adoption of a host of
measures that would otherwise be deemed offensive.471 The argument
becomes not about women per se, but about protecting and promoting
the existence of the state. In fact, when applying state strength to
women’s issues, the state may argue that it too must confront the
public-private divide, turning issues that conservatives view as pri-
vate into public issues. If the public-private divide remains in place,
Afghanistan will never transition out of its fragile state status.
470. It might be useful to note here that King Amanullah was arguably overthrown
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